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George Grant argues that modern innovations in technology are delineated by what he 
terms ‘the co-penetration of art and science’, which disposes their rational methods towards the 
satisfaction of while in a purported ‘spirit of creativity’. Though such a spirit has provided many 
benefits, a natural worry arises as to what may be justified, morally, within the parameters of such 
creativity. For Grant, such skepticism is well-founded as the gradual expansion of technology is 
co-measure with ‘demythologization’, that is, the loss of any sense of objective, transcendent 
purpose. Noting how this worrying trend invites a dangerous premise of making human life 
subordinate to such creative drives, Grant asserts that the highly individualistic nature of modern 
technological thinking ultimately challenges the idea of human dignity itself. However, in his 
Thinking Like a Mall, Steven Vogel argues for the non-existence of nature by attempting to 
demonstrate that the entire world is simply the result of Man’s artifice. Labelling such projects as 
technological, Vogel goes on to say that each technology’s ‘wildness’ prevents it from being 
absorbed into projects of mastery, negating concerns that technology will attempt to master 
human nature. Yet in presenting Grant’s historical examination of the idea of technology, 
particularly as it relates to the ideas of ‘progress’ and Nietzsche’s critique of the same, I will argue 
that Vogel’s view of technology is ultimately inadequate as it does not satisfactorily what Grant 
identifies as the novelty of current technological thinking, which relates to the profound lack of a 
‘myth’ to contextualize our moral decision making in modern technological thinking. Rather, 
Vogel’s account is rather static inasmuch as it equivocates technology with artifacts and does not 
pay adequate attention to how the idea of technology has developed, particularly in recent history. 
As such, Vogel’s moral program fails to address the issues that Grant raises, and thus reinscribes 
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Introduction: A Brief Outline of the Problem of Dignity-Technology 
 
This paper will take as its primary focus George Grant‘s concept of technology, 
and his accompanying concern that technological thinking may obscure human nature 
in ethical situations where discussions on human nature are relevant. As understood by 
Grant, the sort of technological thinking present in contemporary society asserts, at its 
base, the subjugation of all things to the individual’s will and promotes the creative 
development of rational methods and artifacts that allow for the individual to make the 
world valuable to himself. Involving today what Grant calls a ‘co-penetration of the arts 
and sciences’, summarized as subjecting human powers of making to nothing aside 
from the creative will, Grant charges that technology now knows no moral limitation 
aside from this striving for creativity. Citing the widespread dispersion of technologies 
that increasingly seek a mastery over the affairs of life and death, such as the tolerance 
of abortion as a form of birth control, the claimed ‘right to die’ advocated by proponents 
of euthanasia, and the growing interest in genetic editing and cybernetics, Grant alleges 
that the acceptance of these procedures as ethical highlights a sense in which life itself 
is being immorally forced into compliance with the creative potential of technology. Thus 
the simultaneous abandonment of the language surrounding ‘dignity’ as attached to life 
should give us worry, insofar as the assumption of Man as the object of technological 
progress questions the nature of the relationship between technology and human 
dignity.    
The relevancy of this question receives context from previously existing 
paradigms of knowledge as they emerge historically, that is, proceeding from the 





paradigms can be observed as originating in the overcoming of the religiously 
transcribed rituals that colored ancient Athenian society. Accomplished through the 
realization that one ought pursue conduct befitting living within a divinely arranged 
order, Grant observes that Plato was the first philosopher to assert a concrete meaning 
to human life (contemplation), which in turn was successively translated into: the 
Christian paradigm of living in accordance with God’s law in the hope of Armageddon, 
to Man establishing his own freedom in Luther, and to the overcoming of chance and 
necessity in Marx. Yet as Grant suggests elsewhere, what persists through these 
developments are three general principles: first, that of the meta-historical suggestion of 
purpose to human life, which broadly considered is “living together well with others and 
thinking”. Following the introduction of Christianity, second, the idea of history, that is, of 
time and the world as intrinsically meaningful and moving forth towards a particular end 
that will be achieved within it. Third, that Man is and ought to be free, and that it is 
through an exercise of this freedom that he is able to employ rational methods towards 
effectively realizing the centralized ideal of human purpose contained within that age.  
In our current epoch, the centralized ideal seems to be technological innovation, 
and the betterment of Man through it. We are constantly creating, improving existing 
artifacts, and modifying our surroundings. In light of this apparent fact, Steven Vogel 
has sought to demonstrate the non-existence of nature by critiquing the perception that 
nature exists as something independent of human artifice, arguing that human artifice 
has shaped the world such that any sense of nature as something independent of said 
artifice is non-existent. In Vogel’s account, human beings invariably engage in socially 





constructed and dependent on them. But because of what Vogel terms as the ‘gap’ 
between human intention in artifact production and its actual creation, usage, and 
consequences, it can be concluded that artifacts have a stamp of ‘wildness’ which 
prevents the complete absorption of technology into projects of mastery. As a result of 
Vogel’s critique then, it would appear that there is no distinction between technology 
and nature, as both would exist on a continuous stream1 with each other. Thus, if Vogel 
is correct in saying that everything is both technological and “wild”, then there would be 
sufficient reason to reject Grant’s moral worries as being permeated by an unfounded 
fear as to technology’s aims.  
Yet despite Vogel’s arguments, there is still room to suggest that technology’s 
relation to human nature and dignity may be problematic in the way that Grant 
describes. This is because the relation of the aforementioned meta-historical principles 
of technology, for Grant, is in how the presupposition of ‘myth’ (i.e. the particular 
proposition as to the significance and meaning of human life) proposes a vision of 
freedom within a society and thereby ‘determines’ the practical application of those 
rational methods (technique) through which freedom is articulated. But as distinct from 
technique, which seeks some inherent goal that exists in some sense ‘beyond’ it and us, 
Grant notes the activity of technology as “the endeavor which summons forth everything 
(both human and non-human) to give its reason, and through the summoning forth of 
those reasons turns the world into potential raw material, at the disposal of our ‘creative’ 
wills”.2 Tracing the origins of this identification of technology with creative willing to its 
historical roots, Grant points towards Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will and critiques of 
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progress as completely altering what is given in myth. Drawing inspiration from the 
natural history of Darwin, Nietzsche revealed the meaninglessness of time and the 
desire to escape suffering, both of which he argued could be overcome by a select few 
individuals who move beyond Man and learn to dynamically will, thereby making the 
world instrumentally valuable through striving for creativity in the technologies they 
employ; it is here that Grant’s worry emerges: if it is understood that technological 
thinking emerges from a particular presupposition of myth, then it follows that the 
current Nietzschean ‘myth’ of absolute individualism and instrumentality of the world in 
relation to the dynamic will shall dictate the manner in which further development of the 
arts and sciences occur.  
Thus, the recent undertaking of the human subject as the object of creative 
mastery ushers in a type of uncertainty with respect to what the practical moral 
applications of future developments of a completely demythologized technology might 
look like. Because of this uncertainty, and because of the disintegration of moral terms 
like ‘value’, there is sufficient reason to believe that Vogel’s account of human artifice is 
inadequate; in identifying technology as related strictly to artifacts and thereby paying 
insufficient attention to innovations in the idea of technology, Vogel does not appear to 
grasp the novelty of this age’s technological thinking. Indeed, Grant would observe that 
it is only on account of the loss of transcendent purpose to technology that Vogel’s own 
articulation of a materialist, artifactual idea of technology is possibly expressed. 
Following from these comments on the historical development of the idea of technology, 
it will be revealed that Vogel’s ethical and political points, which depend on Man 





Grant raises, inasmuch as Vogel’s “collectivized action” do not stop the root cause of 
the potential for abuse of human dignity presented by the kind of instrumental reasoning 
present in modern technological thinking. In this way, Vogel’s system embraces the 
technological age in the worst sort of way by proposing moral and political solutions that 
in actuality reinscribe the most harmful aspects of technological thinking. In conclusion, 
the system proposed by Grant highlights human dignity as a human good and, if 
heeded, a means by which to both understand and respond to the relationship between 
































Chapter I: George Grant  
 
In order to understand Grant’s points on technology, it is first necessary to 
observe that Grant’s treatment of these words is divided along historical lines, that is, in 
accordance with what Grant identifies as a particular age’s ‘paradigm of knowledge’, 
defined as “the relation between an aspiration of human thought and the effective 
conditions for its realization”.3 Thus, the first step towards understanding what is meant 
by ‘technology’ is a demonstration of how our current, unique definitions of these terms 
are encompassed by our paradigm of knowledge. However, to understand a paradigm 
of knowledge, Grant maintains that one must be aware that Man is an innovative 
animal. The connection between these points is revealed in how the aspirations of a 
paradigm are set via the socially and/or religiously given ideas of human purpose.4 
Here, Grant begins his discussion on the historical paradigms of knowledge by stating 
“How we act depends on what we consider life to be about, what we think is going on in 
human history in general, and in our own lives in particular. We do what we ultimately 
think is worth doing because of our vision of human existence”.5 Though seemingly self-
evident, this quote draws attention to the manner in which previously existing societies 
can be understood, with their ‘actions’ most tellingly revealing what they understood to 
be the defining and most important aspects of human life. In this way, it can be said that 
the relation central to an age’s paradigm of knowledge always contains reference to 
what an age considers life to be about, and that the understanding of purpose is 
formative of the particular period’s aspirations of human thought. Having understood 
 
3 George Grant, ‘Knowing and Making’ Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series IV, xii (1975): 
59-67. Contained within George Grant Reader (Toronto ON, University of Toronto Press, 1998) 409 
4 George Grant Philosophy in the Mass Age (Toronto ON, Copp-Clark Publishing, 1966). 11 





this, Grant begins his discussion of the ancient paradigm of knowledge by stating rather 
plainly “It can be said that this ancient worldview has its most luminous justification in 
the work of Plato, in which time is considered as the moving image of an unmoving 
eternity”.6 As symbolized in how Socrates calmly approaches death knowing that his 
soul was moving into the realm of truth and the divine7Grant argues that this blaisé 
attitude towards death can be appreciated as the result of a certain view of the world 
wherein the world and its temporally conditioned contents only have existence through 
being anchored to the divine. In another work, Grant explains this thought more clearly, 
observing that the Divine is both that which is the highest desire of human life and also 
“the very cause of knowing, that is, that which makes the world intelligible”.8 
From this comes the understanding of meaning in the world as connected to that 
which is participatory in the divine that is, involvement in religious rituals. Distinguishing 
between those individual, “profane” events and those repetitive and universal religious 
acts, Grant notes the relative ‘unreality’ of the former in comparison to the latter 
actions.9 This is because the origins of repetitive and universal acts were alleged to 
precede recorded history and therefore they would not be subject to being part of the 
“moving image”.10 They were conceptualized as part of a divine ordering and served as 
the means by which Man participated in the divine. Every act which was designated as 
integral to civilization shares in a common holiness because of their connection to the 
 
6 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 20 
7 Ibid. 
8 George Grant, ‘Introduction to Plato’ (1973): Contained within George Grant Reader (Toronto ON, 
University of Toronto Press, 1998) 208 
9  Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 17 





divine,11 the importance and ‘eternality’ of which reveals the alleged cyclical nature of 
time; having understood time’s unimportance, the ancients would not have viewed time 
as progressing to an end. Indeed, insofar as time is simply the measure of the ‘unreal’, it 
has no proper metaphysical significance. Of the ancients, Grant explains for them 
“historical time was not really that important. Instead, they saw it as a vehicle through 
which necessity and the good played out their relation over and over again”.12 As such, 
the most effective means of summarizing this ancient paradigm of knowledge would be 
to note that the relation between the awareness and desiring of the divine as purpose-
giving, and the realization of this thought through participation in divine ritual.  
Clearly, however, this is not the paradigm we operate under today, and this fact 
is a sufficient demonstration of what Grant calls the overcoming of this paradigm of 
knowledge, that is, of a fundamental change to it. As for the source of this change, 
Grant points to Plato’s emphasis on the ideal of Man as free, as seen most excellently 
in the doctrines of the soul and of knowledge,13 presents a vision of Man which 
ultimately transcends the archaic form of religious practice, because freedom does not 
afford blind obedience to historically transcribed rituals; if Man is free, then both the 
cyclical nature of time as well as the meaninglessness of it is called into serious 
question. In turn, Grant observes that when Man is understood as free and reasoning, 
the ancient ideal of blind participation in the mythic is translated into the necessity of the 
will to act in accordance with the order in the universe, accessed by human reason.14 As 
distinct from simply being a shadow of the divine, this present and discoverable order 
 
11 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 17 
12 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 22 
13 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 21 





grants meaning to this world, and engagement in the world as itself meaningful. This 
divine ordering, along with the accompanying demand to attune one’s will to it, forms 
the basis of what Grant refers to as ‘natural law’. As part of a divine ordering which is 
both accessible and orders all things in a particular fashion resultant from its immanent 
presence in the world, the discussion on nature here takes a noticeable turn inasmuch 
as nature is understood as operating as law, actively determining what the universe is, 
and dictating the manner in which things are to participate in it, necessitating the 
realization of immanent meaning.15 But as Man is fundamentally free under Plato‘s view, 
this participation must be accomplished via the attempt “to actualize the eternal law in 
one’s own life”,16 which “for Man includes within it the perfection of his rational nature”,17 
here meaning that the realization of Man’s immanent meaning is intimately tied to 
reason, with “reason leading him to know what is right”.18 The way in which this gets 
translated into concrete action is through the will, joined with the proper exercise of 
reason. Now, the moral demands on humanity are based in his participation in the 
whole of nature.  
The other development stemming from Plato‘s contribution is the now meaningful 
nature of time. With the divine now imminently present in the physical world, it could no 
longer be argued that the created world is somehow inconsequential or irrelevant. 
Indeed, it is both intrinsically meaningful because it is a measure of things striving for 
their final end. Yet, though this idea of meaningful time receives its origin in Plato, Grant 
argues that it receives its full flourishing in Christian thought. Stating that the Christian 
 
15 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 30 
16 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 34 
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religion was unique through its emphasis on the Incarnation of Christ in actual historical 
time, this pivotal moment taken in conjunction with the definite end of history at the 
Second Coming suggests a model wherein “history is the divinely ordained process”,19 
with time itself now having a final cause in relation to the efforts of God to save 
humanity. The bringing of time to a delineated end has the effect of suggesting not only 
that time is meaningful, but that it is the measure of a linear progression in which certain 
events are unique and not-repeatable. That is to say, the Christian religion suggests the 
idea of history. The divine has truly entered time, and as a unique expression of the 
divine will of God, the loving act of Man’s salvation reveals time as having immanent 
meaning through it being God’s vehicle for the overcoming of sin and evil. Moreover, the 
centralization of God’s presence in history also reveals the manner in which history is 
understood as a process inasmuch as the linear progression of time post-Christ is 
understood as a divinely guided process pointed towards an end that will be achieved 
within it. Indeed, what is ‘coming-to-be’ now is this process, the final redemption of the 
world, which necessitates both individual and societal moral obedience to both the 
natural and revealed law of God through the cultivation of virtue, and the crafting of 
good laws, offering a paradigm of aspiring towards living in unity with God, effectively 
realized through good moral conduct and the building of the Kingdom of God.  
The synthesis of these views of history and morality means that in a very literal 
sense then, humanity is tasked with realizing the historical moment as participating in a 
continuity which is oriented towards the future. As such, the ancient ideal of harmonious 
participation within the whole is retained, and the permeating presence of the divine 
 





within history contextualizes the ordering of social hierarchies which Charles Taylor 
observes as supplying the social categories through which recognition was bestowed 
insofar as one participated, via his socially prescribed position, within a particular 
society.20 Indeed, insofar as the noble acceptance and performance of one’s given role 
in society contributes to harmony, the social supplement of particular earthly purpose 
within the context of the divine movement of history to an end is something that would 
be integral to the “divinely ordained process of salvation”.21 There is even room here for 
the development and progression of modern science, in that it would be a worthwhile 
pursuit to investigate the causes and operations of a world which is viewed as both 
good and meaningful. The view of human destiny and nature offered by this paradigm is 
thus very comprehensive indeed, as it seemingly provides an overarching framework in 
which morality, social hierarchy, human nature, time, and purpose all exist in a unity. 
As already seen, one of the innovations in the Christian conception of history was 
its ‘process’ view of time as moving toward an end. As an irreversible unique moment 
then, the responsibility for and construction of history was shaped by men towards the 
ends delineated by God, building both a system of good governance to direct Man to his 
proper end and a heavenly kingdom of repentant sinners. But in saying this, it is also 
acknowledged that the choice to live in accordance with the imminent divine order is a 
choice freely made by the will. Yet Grant also points out that this freedom ultimately led 
to a desire for detachment from the natural world.22 No doubt influenced by what he 
perceived as the theologically scandalous union between the hierarchy of the Church 
 
20 Charles Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2003) 48 






and of the State, Luther's criticism that “no Man should find his proper rest in natural 
images”23 is his attempt to combat the rampant abuse found in the Church at that time; 
the articulation of the need for distance from earthly affairs is unmistakable, a criticism 
of the Church and State that led to the theological scandalizing of many laity. Thus, the 
freedom to choose to align one’s will with the divine order was something that, when 
taken in the negative, made it necessary to counteract.  
Luther's solution to the collusion of Church and State was reform through the de-
emphasis of the political and ecclesiastical communities, and established social 
practice. To accomplish this, reformative efforts took on the expression of needing to 
“assert the emphasis on Man’s freedom, which must be regulative of any future theory 
of practice”24 as only through an emphasis on one’s freedom apart from a strict 
adherence to and dependence on hierarchy can one hope to avoid the disastrous state 
of affairs contemporary to Luther.25 Yet within the call to reform there is still a sense of 
profound optimism in the hope of the eventual triumph of evil even when this leads to 
the establishment of a new Church. As Grant observes, the common theme here, taken 
under the label of ‘reform’ through a greater articulation of freedom, is progress, of 
moving beyond evil and towards goodness.26 But as distinct from reliance on the divine 
order as process (which encourages a more passive stance to such developments), the 
emphasis on Man’s freedom so as to separate him from the potentially damning effects 
of association, replaces the idea of divine providence in the world with Man’s activity27 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 50 
25 This theological freedom would take on a more explicitly individualist focus in the thought of Calvin 
26 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 44 





archetypically found in Luther’s attempt at reform. This then unites the idea of freedom 
with progress, here distinguished from the ‘process’ view in that ‘progress’ is understood 
as proceeding from human efforts.  
Given the power and necessity of this new understanding of freedom, it is 
unsurprising that there would be political ramifications as well. As Grant notes, “Indeed 
[the Reformation] asserts this freedom only within the religious sphere, but once it has 
been so asserted, it cannot be confined to that sphere”;28 those same suspicions as to 
the machinations of the Church hierarchy invariably leads us to doubt our political 
superiors. The collapsing of the old ‘horizon of meaning’ as guaranteed by the presence 
of providence in history calls into question the prescribed social order which Man had 
previously found noble to participate in. Hence the need for a new kind of politics which 
appreciates this freedom and does not interfere in the same manner that the Church 
had previously done. Yet the proceeding political philosophers did not completely 
abandon the premise of politics. Instead, they also stress the need of reform, again 
prompted by the idea that evil will be overcome in time through the process of 
development.  
As for how policy of governance changed, the idea of Man as free and removed 
from the natural order necessitates a political approach that does not attempt to subject 
him to powers which exist strictly beyond him, whether proceeding from God or claimed 
as an intrinsic part of the structure of governance. Man’s activity has become central in 
the world, and thus the practice of law making receives its validity not from a divine 
order, but from Man. Here, Taylor describes those philosophers who have historically 
 





taken a negative approach to describing freedom, as something which allows for Man to 
shape history in a way devoid of arbitrary influence,29 that is, of a kind of self-
determining freedom.30 On the level of the individual, Taylor notes how post-Rousseau 
this idea of freedom takes on the form of “being able to do what I want without the 
interference of others because that is compatible with my being shaped by society and 
its laws of conformity”.31 At the societal level, it takes political form “in the nature of a 
social contract state founded on a general will, which precisely because it is the form of 
our common freedom, can brook no opposition in the name of freedom”.32 Here, both of 
the major tenets of the Reformation can be seen: the aversion of extrinsic control that 
caused Luther's scorn toward the Church, and the centralization of Man’s activity 
towards freedom. What therefore becomes of progress is commensurate with the 
developments of the society understood as free and moving gradually towards being 
more rational and just, that is, from a position of subservience to God towards one of 
Man's freedom, which he everywhere achieves through individual and political activity. 
The movement of society towards gradually increasing freedom, it will be correctly 
noted, is inversely related to the hold that Christianity holds over the society.  As Grant 
notes “As belief in God was driven from men's minds... It was replaced... by belief in 
progress. Time is still oriented to the future, but it is a future which will be dominated by 
Man's activity.”33 Following Luther, the notion of intrinsic hierarchy had to be criticized 
on account of the “disappearance” of a divine order which was thought to direct the 
 
29 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 49 
30 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 27 
31 Ibid. 
32 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 28 





world. Yet, because the manifest order was revealed as bad and faulty, the optimism 
surrounding the “overcoming of evil” is permitted to remain, as the triumph over banal 
superstition in all areas of life was affirmed as wholly necessary, good, and only just 
beginning. Each step by which politics was de-mythologized and faith shown as resting 
on significant (perceived) contradictions was simply the advent of reason attaining its 
full flourishing out of its previous suppression, allowing for a newfound “freedom of the 
mind”.34 So applied, this freedom can be summarized as being interdependent with the 
idea of progress; as Man gradually overcomes the superstitions which had previously 
held him in place, he is better able to self-define, construct a better society through laws 
which genuinely respect his freedom, and come back to gradually overcome more 
superstitions. Thus, the paradigm of knowledge is as follows: the aspiration of human 
thought is in the construction of a better society, and this is accomplished through self-
defining freedom and the de-mythologizing of society.  
Yet aside from the developments of freedom, it is also history that progresses. As 
distinct from the other two pieces of the idea of progress, this third sense of the term 
encompasses both with its nebulous command to overcome evil within time through the 
efforts of human activity. Through our efforts to overcome evil, history progresses 
towards the realized Kingdom of Man. But insofar as such an overcoming is articulated 
in the interests of challenging unjustified exercises of power, Grant notes that “If the 
word power is to mean anything, the social and ideological structure of that power must 
be analyzed”.35 And indeed, because the origins and exercises of control are revealed 
as not exclusively resultant from religious influence, this means that the movement of 
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progress must extend beyond a critique of these influences. Thus, Grant places Marx as 
the summation of “modern” philosophy because it is Marx who both draws attention to 
the “indubitable fact of evil” produced by social structures and furthermore insists on the 
idea of progression beyond these problems; Looking towards the development of 
material relations in history, Marx argues that the recognition of scarcity in the world can 
be appreciated as the beginning of the machinations of the class based society, with 
successive emergence of more expansive dominant classes, alongside greater 
developments in industry (technologies), making possible greater freedom for a greater 
number of people.36 But insofar as the problems listed above continue in an age where 
capitalism contradictorily contains “the conditions for overcoming class dominance and 
inequality” while “chaining the mass of men to uncreative labor”, Marx argues that this 
necessitates the overthrow of such a system inasmuch as it is the height of an arbitrary 
exercise of power, needlessly preventing an authentic articulation of freedom. For 
Grant’s purposes, the way forward in Marx’s work is through a practical approach which 
seeks both to make use of political forces already present within the capitalist 
framework, as well as stressing the importance of natural science. Though the 
investigation of the natural world already had an immense importance both for the early 
moderns as well as being meaningful in the Christian paradigm,37 its role in Marx’s 
thought is crucial, becoming “essentially an ethical, indeed a redemptive activity, the 
means by which men were to be freed from the evils of pain and work”. Grant goes on 
to say that “Marx showed [scientists] the role of the scientific function within an 
optimistic and worldly philosophy of history, which had place for the universal interests 
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of humanity”.38 For Marx, the central role of science throughout history has been 
essentially ethical in character, assisting in Man’s domination of the world so that he 
could live more freely. Within the movement towards the revolution, the role of science 
will be in the further development and use of “the everyday world of technology and 
mass industry”39 so as to completely end Man’s problems. In summation then, the same 
optimism found in the previous paradigm of knowledge still exists in Marx’s hope of 
overcoming evil through social-political revolution and further development of sciences, 
albeit changed into a strictly secular and more economic doctrine.  
Yet in taking up the point of technology’s development leading to greater degrees 
of freedom and demythologization, Grant's view of technology is that it has developed 
historically, with greater and more complex artifacts being used to assist in the 
overcoming of evil. Here, Grant’s use of ‘technology’ denotes something novel, and 
emphasizes the idea of technology in relation to ideas of purpose and meaning, 
developing historically from previous paradigms of knowledge. More plainly, this means 
that an analysis of what is meant by technology cannot be content in analyzing artifacts. 
It must also take into account how the emergence of technology is distinct from simply 
the development of artifacts as found in other ages. To do this, it is necessary to also 
analyze how said developments are connected to their age’s paradigm, recognizing that 
technology, while tied to the idea of purpose critical to a paradigm, is unable to fully and 
manifestly express that purpose. A practical demonstration of this can be seen in Marx, 
where the development of science and artifacts serves the hopeful function of leading 
toward the overcoming of evil via ‘transcendence’, here meaning the movement beyond 
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social-politically inscribed evils, through the revolution. However, to say that science of 
the development of artifacts fully encapsulates the Revolution would be incorrect. 
For Grant, this connection between a sense of ‘transcendence’ and the 
development of artifacts and science is a near-constant reality of human development. 
Assigning the senses of transcendent purpose the name “myth”, Grant observes that 
“Myths are the way that systems of meaning are given to most human beings, and it is 
from systems of meaning that we make judgments about what is valuable”.40 What is 
therefore contained within a given paradigm of knowledge, insofar as it suggests 
purpose, is a centralized myth which also determines how a thing is known and the 
conditions by which Man realizes that myth, that is, how Man acts within the world. This 
manner in which the world is known, and subsequent prescription of action is in Grant's 
work assigned the name ‘technique’ and is more fully described as “the totality of 
methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of 
development) in every field of human activity”. Grant goes on to say that “technique is 
not limited to particular examples” like machines, but that it is also “the sum of all 
rational methods used in any society e.g. the police, propaganda, modern education, 
etc.”41 Observing this, by “the totality of methods rationally arrived at”, Grant seems to 
mean those practices, or “means of making” that both produce something physical as 
well as those that are organizational and theoretical, which when taken in conjunction 
with the historical qualifier “for a given stage of development” seems to suggest that the 
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development of technique proceeds in accordance with a particular age, which must 
mean in accordance with the centralized myth. Finally, the focus on “in every field of 
human activity” highlights that, when applied to a particular historical age, technique is 
meant as a sole entity, incorporating all of the methods informed by a particular kind of 
myth. Returning then to the initial description of the principle of a paradigm of 
knowledge, it would seem that on account of there only being one paradigm of 
knowledge for any one civilization at any one time, such a paradigm can be summarized 
as “the relation between the purpose suggested by myth and the realization of this 
purpose through technique”.  
This distinction between the ‘known’ myth and its realization through artifact 
production finds its origin in the ancient paradigm. Summarizing such a view, Grant 
says “the uniqueness of the present co-penetration of the arts and sciences can be 
seen by comparison with how they were once conceived... Our word ‘art’ comes from 
the Latin ‘ars’ which the Romans took as their equivalent for techne” or “leading forth”.42 
As distinct from theoretical knowledge, ‘theoretikeepisteme’, the leading forth refers to a 
certain kind of activity which requires the work of human beings. In Grant’s view, though 
the Greeks thought that art was a kind of knowledge,43 they nevertheless also observed 
a gulf between techne and the knowledge contained in theoretikeepisteme, inasmuch 
as techne was concerned with the production of some kind of artifact, while 
theoretikeepisteme details more theoretical knowledge. As Grant goes on to say “They 
were above all distinguished because they were concerned with different entities. Art 
was concerned with what might or might not be...with entities that were accidentally. 
 






Science was concerned with what must be...with entities that were necessarily”.44 More 
plainly, this is to say that the ancient Greek paradigm views the type of knowledge 
contained in techne to be of a lower sort than that contained in theoretikeepisteme 
(science), as science dealt primarily with the knowledge of the underlying principles 
which would inform any kind of particular practice. Being of a higher sort of knowledge 
then, science was seen as necessary for techne to flourish and in some sense more 
“real” than techne or the physical world as at any time these latter two were part of the 
moving image of an unmoving eternity. The establishment of reflection and 
contemplation as the highest form of life can thus be seen as a direct result of the 
ancient aspiration of seeking to participate in the divine; indeed, contemplation of the 
forms amounts to the most immediate way in which this can be done, as it has the 
divine as its object and involves the desire for it. Therefore, we can say that the 
technique of contemplation found in science is what allows us to make proper sense of 
the arts.  
In comparison, the understanding and utilization of science in the Christian 
paradigm is closer to our modern understanding inasmuch as it is within this paradigm 
that the application of technique first serves the historical role of bringing about the end 
of evil.45 As previously expressed, part of the novelty of Christian thought is the 
introduction of linear, meaningful time insofar as it is connected to the mission of Christ. 
This central myth confirms both time and the world's goodness, and results in a 
procedural view of the nature of things with everything cohering such that the process of 
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technique, aimed at investigating natural causes, is affirmed as good insofar as it 
reveals something of the divine order within the world. In contrast, the transition from 
‘process’ to ‘progress’ in Luther's theology plays itself out in technique by emphasizing 
Man's freedom, as well as a certain skepticism regarding the goodness of the natural 
world. However, this introduces an instrumentality to science not previously present. 
Science is now acknowledged as good for some human-set, achievable goal. That is, 
emergent from Luther's fear of the possibility of scandal, previous forms of thought 
which promoted a passivity to the natural hierarchy of the Church and world are to be 
challenged. Thus, the investigation of the world accomplished through science must be 
done in light of the fact that the natural order is filled with wickedness, and science must 
accord with Man's freedom, ideally proposed as a detachment from the world. “Freedom 
of the human spirit from any determination”46 is the ultimate call of the Reformation, 
which is accomplished through proactive investigations of the world. 
Divorced from its previous role of uncovering the order contained within God's 
creation, science is now seen as a ‘true’ investigation into the causes of the world, and 
in rejecting the idea of God's Providence in history, develops as antagonistic to revealed 
religious faith. Summarizing the remarks of one Professor Anderson, Grant observes 
that this line of reasoning reaches its height in the works of Francis Bacon, who 
“separated completely truth  which is humanely discoverable from the dogmas of 
revealed theology”, revealing “truths of religion as not rational but arbitrary”.47 The de-
establishment of religion’s connection to truth along with the simultaneous insistence on 
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the march of progress towards the conquering of evil is thus revelatory of the further 
instrumentalization of science and its related artifact production; now aligned with 
humanistic ‘progress’, its goal becomes the gradual Improvement of humanity’s lot in 
the face of necessity and chance. Indeed, what else could more profoundly determine 
Man? For Grant, as much is revealed in the work of Rousseau, who argued that “what 
we are is not given to us by what in the ancient language was called nature but is the 
result of what human beings were forced to do to overcome chance or change 
nature”.48The instrumentalization of science and the arts is therefore complete, in that 
technique becomes wholly concerned with separating Man from the natural world 
through the overcoming of the determinacy which restricts his freedom. Indeed, in 
passing from a teleological understanding of Man to one that absorbs the process of 
historical development while negating the teleological, nature emerges as itself 
historically conditioned via processes that are conquered in an attempt to move beyond 
strict dependence on them. In turn, this command to conquer ‘evil’ is taken and joined to 
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Chapter II: Grant on Nietzsche 
Thus the “myth of progress” and its accompanying technique of a free rational 
science has had a profound effect on Western thought, with the modern view of 
technology still seemingly serving this hopeful function of creating a better 
demythologized tomorrow even if it is admitted that there are profound problems with 
our current rational methods. However, throughout the development of these historical 
myths and techniques, it is curious to note the retention of a more generalized 
“purpose”: that of “living together well in communities, and thinking”.49 As much can 
easily be seen in the ancient emphasis on the necessity of science in the ordering of 
Man’s life towards harmony with the divine order, and also in the Christian paradigm 
inasmuch as it emphasized rational contemplation of God’s laws so as to likewise direct 
Man towards his purpose of living in unity with God. Indeed, even in the “atomized” view 
of humanity as detailed in the “myth of progress” proper, there is still a sense in which 
Man must live together and think, if only so as to articulate our freedom and be aware of 
those insidious snares which would hamper it.  
The Marxist idea of progress thereafter translates the idea of technique into the 
strict overcoming of chance and necessity; Aligned with the spirit of progress, science 
and artifact production aim towards an end that will still be achieved within history which 
is the fulfillment of science’s goal of promoting justice and freedom in the world, now 
directed towards the Revolution and culminating in an absolute version of Luther’s 
“detachment from the world”. In this sense, there is still contained within this 
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progression a central recognition of a ‘good’ of humanity; This is contained within the 
language of freedom as the vehicle by which the Kingdom of Man was to be achieved, 
itself an expression of Man’s triumph over superstition and evil, that is, freedom from the 
natural order. The overcoming of evil, which Marxism combines with a critical historical 
method, correlates human development with the emergence of new sciences and 
classes and is thereby ‘progressive’. Man is free, and history follows after him in 
response to his greater articulations of freedom. Yet this myth, and the description of 
history as tracing Man’s gradual overcoming of evil through technology and towards 
freedom is called into question by Darwin’s evolutionary model. Darwin, Grant says, 
brings determinacy to bear on the human subject because in the evolutionary model it 
places Man as produced by chance and necessity like any other animal. As Grant 
observes “Obviously [Darwin] is right, modification is the central issue. And obviously 
also, modification in this sense is just a synonym for history”.50 Here, the open-ended 
nature of such modification poses a serious challenge to the ‘progression’ of history; 
ourselves conditioned by the same physical and chemical laws which gave rise to other 
species, it is thereby understood that history extends far before us, and will continue far 
beyond us. We are simply the efficiently realized product of that ‘endless’ history, and 
so cannot describe history as process or progress.  
The relative acceptance of the Darwinian process of modification introduces for 
Grant a “civilizational contradiction”, formulated as that clash between Man's place 
within natural history and the establishment of freedom within the myth of progress. As 
Grant states “The new co-penetration of logos and techne affirmed at its heart that in 
 





understanding anything we know it as ruled by necessity and chance. This affirmation 
entailed the elimination of the ancient notion of good from the understanding of 
anything” inviting contradiction insofar as “at the same time, our day-to-day organization 
was...directed by a conception of justice formulated in relation to the ancient science, in 
which the notion of good was essential”.51 Yet the secular account of justice contained 
in early modern ideas of government nevertheless drew from Christian ideas of 
establishing equality.52 But, as Grant notes, following the rise of Darwin, this idea of 
justice is up for debate: “To put the matter simply: if species is a historical concept and 
we are a species whose origin and existence can be explained in terms of mechanical 
necessity and chance...what requires us to live together according to the principles of 
equal justice?”.53. In Grant's view, this contradiction could not be resolved with Marx, as 
“Marx is essentially a philosopher of history...one who believes he knows the meaning 
of the historical process as a whole and derives his view of right action therefrom”.54 
More plainly, Grant seems to be expressing that because Marx did not grasp the 
entirety of the movement of natural history, he still professed that history has some 
meaning insofar as the development of society will eventually arrive at the destruction of 
the capitalist form of production. Given the demonstrable proof of the evolutionary 
process, Marx seems at odds with the philosophical consequences of Darwin’s theory 
for the overall meaning of history; Indeed, with no true point of culmination or end, it 
cannot be supposed that history has intrinsic meaning.  
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The contradiction between this determinacy and the idea of Man's freedom 
through justice finds articulation in the work of Nietzsche; as Grant writes “This public 
contradiction was first...exposed in the writings of Nietzsche...what is given about the 
whole in technological science cannot be thought together with what is given us 
concerning justice and truth, reverence and beauty, from our tradition”.55 The point here 
can be made in relation to the ‘meta-historical’ suggestion of purpose “of living together 
and thinking” and the accompanying call to cultivate those virtues which lead to those 
ends. To begin, it is worth noting that the command of “living well together” has 
historically taken the form of the promotion of those values which encourage docility 
towards all including the weaker and more feeble members of society. Given explicit 
form in the Christian aphorism “What you have done for the least of these, so have you 
done for me”, it also finds articulation in the talk of ‘rights’ for the sake of promoting 
human freedom. However, Nietzsche argues that rather than being a guarantor of 
freedom, the insistence on meekness in any form is actually a hindrance to true 
freedom insofar as the propagation of what he designates as a ‘slave morality’ has 
historically suppressed those stronger individuals from acting upon their stronger 
nature. The connection between the establishment of slave morality and the State can 
be seen comparatively between two passages in Zarathustra. In “the Priests”, Nietzsche 
describes those titular figures who live as animated dead because they have taken on a 
life of refusal, of living ashamedly because they have been told that they must be “good” 
in order to move to a better life.56 In light of this command, they become docile and so 
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live their lives in a kind of self-hatred. Such a view in Nietzsche’s account is problematic 
as that in them which would be conducive and life-giving is sapped away through sordid 
pity; pity both for their own great suffering and pity for the so-called less fortunate; 
Indeed, “It was suffering and impotence-that created all afterworld...a poor ignorant 
weariness, unwilling even to will any longer: that created all gods and afterworlds”.57 Yet 
the challenge of God's death is precisely that there is no longer any meaning for this 
suffering, nor justification for any kind of traditional moral thinking, even secular 
reinterpretations of it in the form of the State. Here, Nietzsche says “For the superfluous 
the state was invented” as “having grown weary of fighting [the old God] and now your 
weariness serves the new idol!”.58 In Nietzsche’s view, reliance upon the state to 
establish equality and protection is simply a re-inscribed appeal to pity, the same desire 
to escape suffering that the priests take up in their appeals to God. Thus much like Man 
himself, the State must also be overcome, as its actions block “the rainbow and the 
bridges of the übermensch”.59 
The desire to move beyond Christian ideas of State and morality has radical 
implications for the content of justice, with Darwin’s natural selection sufficiently 
providing an anti-teleological, materialist basis for the emergence of the various forms of 
life and firmly grounded Man as a product of chance and mechanical necessity. Thus, 
the critiques of transcendence found in the anthropological account of Marx and the 
moral critiques of Nietzsche seemingly dispel any residual trust in any form of the 
Christian system, perhaps aside from the idea of a final overcoming of an evil resultant 
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from the Revolution. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Marxist vision of utopia60 
highlights the final failure of progress. In contrast, Nietzsche properly understood the 
historicity of Man and as such “The historical sense is more precise than a general 
recognition of the change in and between civilizations which make up that bridge. It is 
the apprehension that in the shortest moment we are never the same, nor are we ever 
in the presence of the same. Put negatively, in the historical sense we admit the 
absence of any permanence in terms of which change can be measured or limited or 
defined”.61 As borrowed from the secularized Christian view, the idea of progress was 
used to explain the further emergence of reason within the world, greater societies 
being built in relation to greater articulations of freedom and reason. Yet just as science 
had been able to explain the origin of non-human species through a process without a 
final purpose, Grant notes “Nietzsche sees that...so also are there no reasons to justify 
belief in the goodness of rationality as our given purpose”.62 The attempt to inject value 
into history via the prizing of that which-will-be falls flat because it is suggestive of a 
false transcendent purpose. So it is also with the idea of progress to history, which 
assigns even in its most minimalist form an eventual fullness to being within time 
through the attaining of freedom. Both are the assertion of some inarticulate hope which 
is not to be found within time; As Nietzsche draws attention to, such a prioritization of 
good serves to make weak those who would otherwise be resolute in the face of the 
constant evil Man finds himself surrounded by. To embrace life is to embrace it in all its 
sufferings, to be firm in the face of the constant presence of pain. Those who are unable 
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to bear such pain, like the priests and worshippers of the State, turn towards the 
creation of horizons by which they can orient themselves in a world where time has no 
purpose.63 Therefore, there can be no illusions as to the idea of progress; the traditional 
idea of progress presupposes a definite end in the sense that the thing in question is 
moving towards some ‘perfect’ state, but Nietzsche reveals that there is no definite end 
to anything, including time itself. In what may be described as a return to the ancient 
view, time is rendered meaningless. But more bleakly, Nietzsche shows time as both 
containing suffering and having no illusions as to the divine within it.  
The challenge to the Christian paradigm, and its secular version, is thus more 
comprehensive in Nietzsche than in Marx, because Nietzsche challenges the very idea 
of an intrinsic purpose to existence. In demonstration of this point, Grant cites a 
passage from Zarathustra which details the discovery of the identical and of the eternal 
return towards “the number of possible combinations of what exists is finite, yet time is 
infinite”.64 As such, nothing ‘progresses’ in a universe where infinite time repeats the 
same patterns in different orders time and again. Everything is always ‘coming-to-be’ 
with no event of thing being meaningful in and of itself, as it is fated to recur again, with 
moment of suffering happening infinitely across time. The will can find no ‘final goal’, no 
achievement within the world through the seeking of particular objects or things. For the 
majority, such a thought is unbearable, which is why Grant observes that upon the 
realized death of God there will be three kinds of people: The first group, whether 
secular or Christian, presume that there is some point to existence, that they have in 
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some way “joined their efforts to participating in its goodness”65 by arguing for equality, 
even if such a point is not evident. Yet others will see the same meaninglessness and 
turn out to be utterly destructive; the nihilists will simply exert their will over the 
population because they have understood the meaninglessness of time and of the 
world, but have not been able to affirm life and so will “nothing”.66 The last category, 
those strong men, achieve not only an awareness of the meaninglessness of the world, 
but are able to apply their wills in such a way that produces joy.67 Indeed, with both 
destruction and apathy off the proverbial table, the only thing left is creation. They are 
able to overcome the evils of the world through their will.68  
Yet this bleak discovery of the eternal return encourages those who are strong to 
move towards the creation of novelty;69 Though any temporal arrangement of things is 
fated to happen again, this does not perturb the strong, as it gives them license to 
create those things which affirm life and make the world instrumentally valuable to them. 
Such creation has happened before and will happen again, so joy will take the form of a 
dynamic making because the universe is, in essence, a dynamic making that is always 
becoming without an end goal. We are fated to live in a world of complete dynamism, 
and so the only real option for a select few is to extend their will in a necessarily 
individualized and life-affirming way; in recognition of this perpetual “finality of 
becoming”, the only choice to be made is willing. Thus we find in Nietzsche a complete 
rejection of the Western paradigm as there is no chance to gravitate towards some 
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meaning which is outside of the world. As Grant explains “For Nietzsche, the 
achievement of amor fati outside is any such involvement. It must be willed in a world 
where there is no possibility of either infinite or finite transcendence of becoming or 
willing”.70 
In saying this however, it must be noted that this radically changes the content of 
justice; for if the highest aspiration of human thought is dynamic, creative willing by a 
select few, then the Christian and secularized maxim of “Do unto others as you would 
have done to you” is no longer applicable; Indeed, “Man is something to be overcome” 
and this overcoming means the abandonment of certain positions which attributes worth 
to Man intrinsically. The fact that there are some people who are indeed superior71 
means that we cannot morally treat all people the same. As such, Nietzsche contests 
any account of justice which places at its heart the extension of some kind of worth to all 
mankind; Man only has value in as much as his overcoming contributes to the rise of 
the übermensch. Indeed, the übermensch directs his energies towards creative willing 
based on his realization of the eternal return, and of the production of all things in the 
world through necessity and chance. He will not recognize a transcendent sense of 
worth to all humanity that extends beyond that which is admitted by his eternally 
recurring, mechanically produced composition. Though this by no means permits 
outright cruelty as Nietzsche would classify such cruel “preachers of death” as 
nihilists,72 it does mean that “when men know themselves beyond good and evil, the 
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strong are moved to the violence of an undirected willing of novelty”.73 As Grant notes, 
there are some in Nietzsche’s account to whom nothing is owed.74 Put simply, this 
means that in the dynamism of creative willing by the übermensch, should it be the case 
that some of the otherwise protected ‘weak’ people receive the proverbial “short end of 
the stick”, then that is of no consequence to the übermensch as nothing of value was 
lost. Man only has instrumental usefulness in relation to the übermensch’s coming. He 
is therefore at the best of times only a tool, and beyond the coming of the übermensch, 
expendable in relation to creative willing.  
This concluding emphasis on value and instrumentality draws us both towards 
Nietzsche’s vision of justice as well as what Grant means by technology: on the first 
matter, Grant quotes Nietzsche: “Justice as function of a power with an all encircling 
vision, which sees beyond the little perspectives of good and evil...having the aim of 
maintaining something which is more than this or that person;75” “Justice as the building, 
rejecting, annihilating and way of thought which precedes from the appraisement of 
value: highest representative of life itself”.76 The move being made here is the fullness 
of Nietzsche's rebuke against both priests and the false idol of the state; as 
emphasizing the building and rejecting which precedes from the value of that highest 
representative of life itself, the übermensch, it makes ‘justice’ and ‘the creative willing of 
the übermensch’ synonymous. The ‘making valuable’ of the world by the übermensch is 
a possibility afforded to him not because of some inherent worth, but because he is able 
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to will the dynamic coming-to-be which pains so many others. In this way, he 
overcomes the spirit of revenge joyously.77 Further, his creative efforts are justified: 
despite the effort to contextualize suffering via the myths summarized, the fact remains 
that suffering is meaningless. If therefore a person is content to be subject to the 
meaninglessness of life without trying to assert their will, then any joy which would have 
been reached by following Nietzsche’s program is denied them and so their materially 
based existence is revealed as just as expendable as any other physical object. The 
claiming of both the human and non-human world as part of the übermensch’s creative 
domain is therefore just, as such a claim is made by a “superior” being who creates a 
quality of life. Insofar as the übermensch wills to create, and finds joy in this task, his 
creative willing is the distinct act of one who has overcome both the need for 
transcendence and desire for revenge.78  
The difficulty in describing Nietzsche’s thought in the familiar language of a 
paradigm of knowledge is that it subverts both of the meta-historical purposes to human 
life. In its individualistic project, it shuns “living together”. In articulating the un-
importance of truth-seeking for survival, it shuns thinking.79 Indeed, it is anti-mythic in 
that it does not suggest any kind of universal purpose. Nevertheless, we can still say 
here that the aspiration of human thought would be making the world valuable, and the 
effective conditions of this would be the act of creative willing. But as this aspiration 
seeks to negate all forms of transcendence, its accompanying technique must 
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necessarily take the form of “The human creating of quality of life beyond the little 
perspectives of good and evil... of making the human race greater than it has been,80 
that is to say, the act of creation no longer aims at some ‘good’, but is instead turned 
inwards towards itself, with dynamic creative willing providing context to the art of 
artifact production. Moreover, as there is no corresponding myth that so directs the 
progression of creativity, what is “known” in this technique is simply that scientific factual 
information which is aligned to the craft. This interdependence of knowing and making is 
what Grant means by the word technology. For its full articulation, ‘technology’ requires 
the critiques of Nietzsche. The novelty of the idea of technology can be seen through its 
historical developments in the historical paradigms of knowledge. More than simply the 
production of more or less complex artifacts, technology is the rational methods that 
correspond to the now present co-penetration of arts and sciences resultant from the 
loss of transcendent purpose.81 It is a form of the meta-historical technique, but one 
where the frontiers of what is morally permissible to make have been eliminated in light 
of the critiques against any possibly articulated “myth”; But as artifact production and 
the direction of knowledge move towards the creative overcoming of the laws of chance 
and necessity govern all that is, they are limitless in their potential practical application. 
Put another way, the application of the now morally unrestrained creative will central to 
technology allows for technology to objectify anything which is governed by chance and 
necessity. As Grant writes, the position of technology is such that “everything is an 
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object and our relation to it is to summon it before us to give us its reasons”.82 The irony 
of such a demand should not be lost on us as it is impossible in the described position 
for any object to “give us its reasons” because each object exists without given purpose. 
Therefore in the process of using technique to conquer the chances of an indifferent 
world, the failure of anything to give us its reasons allows for a certain kind of 
instrumentality in our reasoning; the will represents to itself the entire world as object, 
each thing existing as a receptacle for the creative process as act of dynamic willing. 
Yet in producing ‘quality of life’, the utilization of technology’s rational methods 
increasingly takes the form of representing that which it produces as “morally neutral”. 
Again, the surpassing of good and evil allows the world to be treated as subject to the 
creative willing, with all objects neither being good or bad, but simply existent. In 
explaining this point, Grant deconstructs the aphorism “The computer does not impose 
on us the ways it should be used”. What is contained in the statement is that because of 
the instrumentality of objects in relation to the creative will “They are neutral instruments 
in the sense that the morality of the goals for which they are used is determined outside 
them”.83 What is important for the espouser of such a maxim is that the capacities of the 
computer are contained within it, but their use is dependent on the intentions of the 
computer’s user. Yet uttering this maxim ignores that the capacity is contained within 
the computer or the result of events which have led to the existence of said computer. 
Aside from the obvious reliance on mathematics, physics, materials, and so forth, the 
creation of the computer is particular to the paradigm of knowledge we know post-
 
82 David Cayley George Grant in Conversation (Toronto: Anansi 1995), ‘Interview on Martin Heidegger’ 
Contained within George Grant Reader, 301 





Nietzsche. As Grant explains “The very force of the computer as neutral raises up in the 
statement, in opposition to that neutrality, an account of human freedom which is just as 
novel as our new instruments”.84 Affirmation of this fact is concealed but present within 
the initial statement; the fact that the computer presents itself as free from any given 
purpose presupposes the complex coming-to-be of an account of human freedom that 
permits us to utilize the computer according to one's will. In this way, the generation of 
computers represents the “paradigm of knowledge central to our civilizational destiny” 
and is representative of “all the fundamental presuppositions that the majority of human 
beings inherit...which are so taken for granted as the way things are that they are given 
an almost absolute status”.85 Yet within these fundamental presuppositions of freedom 
and value, the initial aphorism is rendered false, for these assumptions of freedom and 
creativity are what motivate the development of contemporary science and the 
construction of the computer. Thus, the ‘neutrality’ of the computer actually reinforces 
the paradigm.  
Though the modern generation of artifacts in effect reinforces the paradigm, 
artifacts do not capture all that is meant by such a paradigm. This is because in Grant’s 
view, beyond the historical development of the idea of technology and the artifactual, 
technology also forms an ontology. As already discussed, the representation of the 
world as ruled by chance and necessity allows for the things of the world to be regarded 
as pure objects of the will. What develops from this is that the will stands as the arbiter 
of goodness, that is, it makes the world valuable by its creative activity. As Grant 
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observes, such a relation between the will and the world has a curious consequence of 
divorcing Man from the world in some way; saying “Technological society is presented 
to us as a set of neutral means, something outside ourselves, and human beings are 
presented as in touch with some constant... But obviously all that is given us in the 
technological sciences denies that constancy, that eternality. What happens is that 
constancy is appeal to impractical life and denied in intellectual life”,86 Grant is here 
trying to express that the act of the creative will, while good and life-affirming in 
Nietzsche's account, produces things which themselves are neutral. From their creation 
onwards, they are distinct from the will, and so in some sense are outside what is meant 
by ‘human’. They are rational methods, and exist as entities ready to be utilized. Yet in 
promoting a  further adherence to technological principles of creation and value through 
the production of so-called ‘neutral’ artifacts, the process of technology becomes 
somewhat autonomous from human activity per se;87 though the application of the term 
only retains insofar as humans continue to utilize these principles and produce artifacts, 
the existence of technology is beyond both the artifact itself and the particular creative 
willing of a person. This cycle of ‘artifact production-reinscription’ thereby suggests a 
particular way of being in the world: by promoting certain principles of freedom and 
value, their adoption by the mass of society promotes an ontology of will-object that 
dominates contemporary understandings of science and artifact production.  
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Thus, Grant’s worry about the “bringing forth” of all that is contained within this 
principle is in how it will affect the way we conduct ourselves morally. On account of his 
own ideal of justice as “an unchanging measure of all our times and places'' as 
connected to our “desiring need of an unchanging good which caused us to pay its 
price”,88 Grant sees the seeking of novelty through creative mastery as particularly 
troubling. This is because, as previously detailed, technology knows no moral limit in the 
act of making. Rather, it sees the entirety of the world as potential for creative willing. 
This preoccupation with making the world instrumentally valuable takes on the term 
“quality of life”, which as Grant considers at, involves the assertion of the primacy of the 
will in all things. Indeed, the necessity of exerting the will is paramount for as the world 
is devoid of meaning, the only available option is to pursue a kind of quality of life 
through the expression of the will. But aside from the obvious subjugating of all things in 
the world to continual change89 through perpetual modification in pursuit of greater and 
greater quality of life, the triumph of the creative will also promotes an ethical decision 
making system where the entire world stands in relation to the will as fundamentally 
empty of value; because the exertion of the will is made synonymous with creativity, 
Grant notes that this renders impossible any traditional account of justice because the 
process of dynamic willing always excludes any reference to a central idea beyond that 
which has been declared instrumentally useful to the particular individual. Thus when 
contrasted with the demands of justice, the problem emerges that the understanding of 
Man as strictly materially contingent will necessitate a prioritization of the individual, with 
social relations only existing so as to allow Man to articulate his creativity. The horrifying 
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conclusion for Grant is in how this will challenge ideas like human dignity. To 
demonstrate, let us here consider the following question: aware that life is entirely 
materially contingent and that there exists the possibility of a person having a 
debilitating injury or chronic condition that somehow impedes their quality of life or 
otherwise makes life irreparably burdensome, what would morally prevent such a life 
from being declared unenviable and therefore worthy of extermination? The absolute 
individualism present in Nietzsche's critique forces the conclusion that some life simply 
is not worth living. Furthermore his critique denies any sense of moral obligation which 
charges that all men are owed a certain level of respect simply because they exist.90The 
final disappearance of both following the critiques of Nietzsche asserts that life is at its 
base meaningless and so Man must do the only thing he can and creatively will. If 
therefore a person is unable to creatively will because of some deficiency, such as 
being in a vegetative state/being otherwise radically dependent on others, then it would 
seem that their life is not owed any respect.  
 Now granting this conclusion, it may be responded that it is still not automatically 
true that we owe such people death or detriment either. And while this is true insofar as 
Nietzsche’s critique does not allow for the establishment of any universally prescriptive 
moral commands, the point should be taken that its neutrality leaves the debate open 
for the individual as to how best to proceed. Yet in any case, the treatment of these 
individuals under the Nietzschean paradigm is contingent upon the personal 
dispositions of those strong men. And indeed, given what Nietzsche says about pity,91 
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there is reason to suggest that said dispositions will not be inclined towards charity. But 
there is even more room for worry given that the “frontiers of making” present in science 
are ever directed both at the pursuit of novelty and the affirmation of the private person. 
I do not mean this comment to suggest that science and technology are somehow 
private pursuits of the individual. What I mean is that the aims of science, as a result of 
the co-penetration of the arts and sciences, now aim at the overcoming of chance and 
necessity purely for the sake of enhancing the life of an individual. There are no 
“frontiers” of making anymore, as everything is permitted. Indeed, on account of the loss 
of community and teleological direction in science, as well as the contingency of life 
upon physical matter which is determined by chance and necessity, there are no 
absolute moral limits as to what can be made or unmade.92 And as the spread of 
technological thinking gradually displaces the moral restraints of an ever-waning 
Christian ethic, there can be little doubt that our quest for the overcoming of chance and 
necessity and making men ‘better’ through dynamic willing inevitably will take the form 
of trying to control aspects of life which were previously conceptualized as either being 
an essential expression of Man's freedom or declared as part of the intrinsic goodness 
of life bestowed by God. What then does making society better look like? Grant’s 
answer is quite grim: “To sum up: the overcoming of chance to which we are committed 
builds institutions which more and more negate the freedom and equality for the sake of 
which the whole experiment against chance was undertaken”.93 As the will is power,94 
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technology finds its expression in the assertion of power (the will) over necessity and 
chance, and as all men are ruled by the same physical laws of necessity and chance as 
the existence of anything else empirically verifiable, the Will comes to be asserted over 
people in general. Towards the generation of an overall better “quality of life”, we 
therefore cannot be surprised when a life is deemed to be of no quality, that such a life 
is cast aside, brutalized, or extinguished. These lives have no value, as any value which 
would have been contained in the act of creative willing is unable to be expressed, and 
so they have value only in relation to the private pursuits of other individuals. Yet so 
considered, the question may still be asked as to who or what determines the direction 
of the political and moral applications of value within technology. Indeed, given the 
seemingly democractic and social nature of our practices, we may doubt Grant’s 
















Chapter III: Vogel’s Rejection of Nature  
Having detailed this historically based context, it would seem that our current 
myth and technique is aligned with the Nietzschean model, insofar as the 
demythologized development of technologies aims at the overcoming of chance and 
necessity through the constant improvement of artifacts and sciences without a 
centralized sense of transcendent purpose. Yet this lack of purpose is not to say it is 
directionless. Rather, Grant alleges that post-Nietzsche, this co-penetration advocates a 
spirit of creativity that allows for a greater proliferation of scientific and artifactual 
developments. Indeed, it follows that as moral restraints are loosened, previously 
prohibited areas of science and technological innovation are re-assessed as 
permissible, thereby expanding both the fields themselves and increasing the number of 
artifacts that said fields produce. The moral problem, therefore, is seemingly related to 
the centralized radical individualism which subjects all things to itself. But as Steven 
Vogel makes clear in his Thinking Like A Mall, there is reason to doubt Grant’s 
description of an individualistic technology which opposes ‘nature’. This doubt proceeds 
in two ways: First, that such an expansion would seemingly suggest that the world we 
inhabit is more built than natural and thus we may reject the idea of nature. Second, as 
Vogel makes clear, the expansion of these artifactual developments in a globalized and 
thereby social manner would seemingly suggest the prescription of value via the 
collective. Regarding the first, and following the comments of environmentalist Bill 
McKibben, who argued that Man’s complete changing of the planet’s environment 
makes impossible any discussion of nature as distinct from human activity, Vogel 





the terms “nature” and “human activity” as mutually exclusive categories. This 
distinction centers on the purported division between what is considered ‘natural’ and 
what is ‘human made’.95 The relevant distinction is found in how they came to exist. 
Something human made is clearly designed, constructed to fit our needs. Conversely, 
something natural observes no human tinkering and is thus alleged to have meaning 
independently and intrinsically; By virtue of Nature’s existence as somehow outside the 
realm of human affairs, it is conceptualized as possessing an intrinsic meaning not 
present in the intention or construction of an artifact, a meaning which it retains as long 
as they continue to exist beyond the bounds of any human interference.96  
Thus as a defining feature of McKibben’s view, nature’s existence depends on its 
independence, but is fragile in that its conversion into something unnatural is a process 
accomplished with the greatest of ease. Yet it is precisely this fragility and necessity of 
nature’s independence that generates so many problems within the environmental 
movement. The first is that it produces within environmental philosophy a crisis of ends. 
Indeed, insofar as the goal of the prevailing model of environmental philosophy seeks 
the conservation of this form of nature, it is left relatively meaningless with its inherent 
goal never possibly being achieved. There is no nature to protect, and as such, no point 
to engage in environmental conservation practices. Moreover, this insistence on the 
total independence of nature puts the quasi-moral necessity of defending such an area 
at odds with the practical application of how this would be done through human action. 
Indeed, conservation efforts invariably necessitate human intervention in the ‘setting-
aside’ of land for preservation and appreciation, thereby making the project self-
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defeating. Likewise, attempts to restore a particular piece of land to its former natural 
state would involve a human effort with said beginning as unnaturally modified and 
remaining so as it flourishes according to human design. Thus, on both a practical and 
theoretical level, the aim of the environmental project is at odds with the means by 
which to accomplish its own objective.  
The inability of this conception of nature to address the practical concerns of 
environmental issues in turn raises another more serious criticism: in insisting on an 
idea of nature that arguably has never existed, we are doing a disservice to the 
environment by paying insufficient attention to and not changing those practices which 
are (somewhat) under our control. Tacit awareness of this fact is even acknowledged in 
the conservationist’s effort mentioned above, as she sees it as her duty to protect 
nature’s naturalness from human activity. As Vogel notes “McKibben’s concern with 
nature is really a concern with human beings...The value he finds in nature is really a 
value in negation-in humans not doing things, not changing things, not acting”.97 But to 
meet the demands of the current environmental crisis is to respond to the ability of 
human beings to create, and respond to that which we created. The problems of the 
environment lay with us, not with what may be said about an unhelpful extrinsic 
conception of nature. 
This point on the human ability to create aligns well with the second view of 
nature, as encompassing all physical processes and things. As distinct from the view of 
nature’s meaning as independence, the second view of nature ascribes ‘naturalness’ to 
everything within the physical world. Of course, this would by definition include those 
 





efforts of Man to change and shape his environment. The collapsing of the previously 
existing dualism between Man and nature is by recourse of the previously neglected 
truth that Man and his practices are indeed as natural as anything else that exists. 
Previously, Man was thought of as distinct from nature because of some ill-defined 
conception that Man possessed some quality which set it as both distinct from and 
superior to the rest of the world. Yet, as Vogel makes his readers aware through a 
passing comment, Darwin managed to illustrate that mankind has emerged not from a 
pre-ordained order to the world, but from the same physical processes which give rise 
to all species.98 Thus, assuming that mankind has passed beyond the appeal to 
suggestions as to ultimate purpose, Darwin highlights that our place among the animals 
offers us no recourse to believing that we are ontologically superior. As such, our 
behaviors such as building houses and tending to agriculture are fundamentally no 
different than the survival based strategies of other creatures.99 Rather, they are just as 
natural as anything else, albeit perhaps more complex. What the first definition of nature 
lacks in its rather fragile and “absolute” conception, this second version of nature 
contradicts and improves upon with its inclusiveness.  
However, this second version of nature is also unable to be practically applied 
towards solving the environmental crisis; As Vogel puts it, we need “an environmental 
theory [which] is supposed to tell us something normative about our relationship to 
nature”.100 Yet if we accept this second version of nature, a judgement cannot even be 
made as to what is natural as the definition of ‘nature’ as “all physical and biological 
 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. Here, Vogel cites the building of dams by beavers as an example 





processes” encompasses all actions. Therefore, to speak of human actions which ‘do’ 
anything to nature is to confuse the point; such actions change nothing ontologically, as 
nature already encompasses them. The definition of nature in this second case, then, 
would also seem to falter on the same principle of being unable to comprehensively 
incorporate human action.  Following from this, if nature is so vast as to include all 
physical and biological processes, then our destructive actions are just as ‘natural’ as 
any actions which may be called beneficial; Thus, a distinction as to those actions which 
‘hurt’ or ‘help’ nature would be nonsensical, as they all would be equally natural, with 
‘nature’ unable to be harmed by actions which are themselves natural. Conceptualized 
in this way, nature would thus offer no standard by which to judge actions. As such, it is 
antithetical to the general environmental movement, which is compelled in its project by 
such judgements. 
Vogel on Nature 
 To use Vogel’s language, both normative definitions of ‘nature’ encounter the 
issue of the environment’s “builtness”, that is, they fail to take in account that human 
beings do not passively live in an environment, but actively construct it. As alluded to 
previously, Vogel’s solution to this problem is to abandon the idea of nature101 entirely 
and focus on those social practices which shape and determine the world. Citing the 
view of nature as a social category as advanced by Lukács, Vogel introduces the 
significance of mutability within nature, that is to say, what is included in a view of 
nature is “varied from society to society and from historical period to historical 
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period...reflecting facts about the social order in which they occur”.102 Indeed, as much 
should be obvious from a historical view; it is a matter of fact that the meaning of nature 
within philosophy has varied in accordance with historical and geographical 
parameters.103 But the social aspect of nature has a deeper meaning for Vogel than 
simply social construction of the idea of nature within society; Vogel instead presents 
the argument that nature itself is socially constituted, with the physical world being 
determined by these same social-physical practices. Expanding on the observation of 
Man’s ability to shape his environment, Vogel rightly points out how this ability is 
something which has always been present for Man; Invariably, Man is actively engaged 
in the world, coming into contact with other human beings, and using common powers 
of making for survival, at all times engaged in concrete physical practices which at once 
change the world and change Man’s understanding of the world.104 Indeed, if it is given 
that “the environment” is simply that which surrounds us,105 then the ontological claim of 
the environment as constituted can be demonstrated as proceeding from the observable 
fact that our practices do indeed change that which surrounds us, resulting in new 
identities of the land. 
The change in identity, emerging from a qualitative change in material substance, 
is accordingly reflected in knowledge claims. Proceeding from the aforementioned 
qualitative changes in identity, it follows that in the epistemological act of “knowing”, the 
known object is at any point contingent upon those practices which humans have 
performed. This in turn unites the historical determinacy of the idea of nature with the 
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manner in which the environment is physically determined; the conception of nature 
would in turn be formed by those practices at any point historically employed. Yet Vogel 
does not leave the matter of this physical determinacy of nature to rest in a kind of 
socially determined idealism, wherein the environment simply exists for the employment 
of human mastery over it. Rather, Vogel’s view is qualified by the social and active role 
of those practices, as well as the admission that “matter is always practical”.106  
As stated above, the practices employed in shaping the world are not limited to 
the creative output of the individual, but instead are a direct result of socialization. Vogel 
notes that it was Hegel who first placed the genesis of knowledge within a historical, 
inter-subjectively reached process.107 As part of the historical fabric, the actions of men 
proceed socially, which for Hegel means that these practices find their origin in the 
Spirit, towards which the collective practices of Man contribute. Thus in a very real 
sense, Hegel attributes the constitution of the world108 to those socially given practices, 
as it is through these that the world can be known. The world and the practices that 
construct it, are thereby socially and historically constituted.  
But even the demonstration of the social characteristic of practice is insufficient 
as these practices must be physical, real processes. Vogel explains this necessity 
succinctly by noting that Hegel still suffers from the mistaken Cartesian belief that 
knowing is somehow done solely with the mind,109 allowing the knower to stand outside 
the world as knower/constitutor, as somehow still distinct from that which is known. The 
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problem with such a division is one and the same as the problem contained within a 
pronounced focus on the idea of nature; it allows for a proverbial “escape hatch” by 
which one can ignore the problems that accompany our actual, materially based 
practices.  
Thus, Vogel draws particular attention to how Marx centralizes the importance of 
labor as the primary vehicle of practice. As Vogel states “To say that we can come to 
know the world only insofar as we constitute it...is to say that we know it because we 
build it, through the actual processes of labor, of physical acting and making, that are 
fundamental to who we are”.110 From Hegel’s emphasis on the importance of social 
practice comes the epistemological claim that the world is only known through our 
constitution, a claim which Marx turns toward labor through the observation that acts of 
physical construction are essential to human beings. Thus, insofar as human beings 
actively shape the world through their practices, what is known is different. Yet there is 
an important distinction to be made here in that the grounding of such a change is made 
not in isolation, or rarely in accordance with the private aims of the individual, but by and 
through the already present practices in the world. What this means for the individual 
subject, quotes Vogel from Heidegger, is a sense in which a person “is always already 
in the world”.111 Following Marx’s identification of practices as physical processes, and 
Hegel’s observation that such processes are both social and follow in succession to 
each other in generating knowledge, it becomes impossible for Man to stand outside the 
natural order as a disembodied mind which finds itself passively engaged in the 
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world.112 Rather, because Man exists as an animal which must engage in these world-
changing material processes,113 Man’s engagement in the world is prior to any 
knowledge which he may possess114 itself arising and expressed within these practices. 
Practices, as physical engagement, thus constitute the world and reveal knowledge to 
be linked to active and concernful involvement.115  
As the historical development and determinacy of practice shows, every age 
deals with practice in a manner particular to it, applying them to the challenges faced 
contemporaneously. This being the aim of practice more generally, the question of their 
origin is shown as irrelevant on two fronts; first, such a question is entirely beside the 
point, at least when it concerns how to handle environmental issues. The problems 
associated with the environment today are specifically the challenge of our 
contemporary applications of practice, and so attempting to trace the origin of these 
practices to some unknown past would be impractical for such concerns. More 
importantly, if we truly understand that Man is in the world and cannot help but change it 
through his physical practices, then to question the origin of practice or physicality is to 
suggest a problematic dualism between practice and matter. For Vogel, such a position 
is untenable; practice and matter are interdependent. This then culminates in Vogel’s 
point that matter is always practical.116 Indeed, much like how practice requires material 
(per Marx), Man’s involvement in the world means that, due to the extensive history of 
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Man modifying and shaping the environment, it becomes fruitless to speak of “matter” 
as unqualified by human practice.  
The truth of these observations having been granted, however, this is still to say 
nothing about the actual “products” of our material practices, our artifacts. Vogel 
repudiates what he considers to be an idealism about artifacts, wherein artifacts exist 
purely as extensions of human intention, being demonstrative of the material world’s 
status as receptacle for creative output. Contrarily, Vogel notes that artifacts “always 
have more to [them] than [their] producers intended…” every artifact “having a nature 
that exceeds human intention”.117 What this means is that artifacts exist beyond the 
strict intentions of their designers, with the process of ‘making real’ the artifact 
necessarily involving a passing from the intention of the designer (completely ideal) and 
into the world of practice, of material reality. Practice, as materially situated, does not 
always permit what is contained within the thought of a particular designer because the 
process of realization always involves consequences or purposes not contained within 
the designer’s vision. In demonstration of this, Vogel cites the existence of Columbus’ 
City Center Mall. Aside from its designed purpose of generating profit and increasing 
the overall wealth of the area, the mall also served for use as an occasional resting 
place for birds, as an exercise regimen by mall-walkers, as a charter school, or as turf 
for gangs to fight over.118 The mall certainly had a human intention, several in fact, but 
the realization of the artifact involved far more consequences and purpose than these.  
This point as to the existence of unforeseen consequences and purpose 
associated with artifact production is further seen in Vogel’s observation of the very real 
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possibility of resistance within our practices. Returning briefly to the discussion of ideal 
versus practice, it is recognized that an ideal remains distinct from the embodied work 
and labor involved in the construction of the environment, as the ideal does not involve 
these consequences and additional purposes. By the same token then, the ideal does 
not involve a tendency towards resistance. But as any engineer would agree, practice 
does. Though not so much an inherent problem with practice as opposed to simply 
being a characteristic of it, Vogel notes that it is the encountering of resistance, of this 
possibility of failure that distinguishes practice from theory.119 Indeed, there are hard 
limits on what our powers of making can produce, and even in making the artifact, we 
encounter great difficulty. The relevance of these comments for an understanding of 
Vogel’s use of the term artifact is that this realization of “resistance” in our practices 
points towards what Vogel refers to as the ‘wildness’ of artifacts.  
Recalling the transformative effect that human practice has upon the 
environment, Vogel‘s use of the term wildness in relation to artifacts can be better 
appreciated when one considers current environmental restoration efforts. Though the 
common definition of restoration as ‘repatriating’ nature has been shown to be 
problematic per Vogel’s critiques, the concept of correcting the damage done before 
allowing the affected land to return to operating relatively under its own powers still 
usefully illustrates the presence of forces which operate independently of human 
intervention.120 When restoration efforts are undertaken, the emphasis is placed on 
approximating what the land was like before, and after striving for this goal, allowing 
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‘nature’ to return. But while naturalness cannot return,121 what does are those biological 
and ecological processes which thereafter need relatively little human intervention to 
continue. Though some of these processes are in a sense put into motion through the 
human act (planting a seed and allowing it to germinate, for example), they ultimately 
operate beyond both the ability of Man to completely understand, or control, and are 
indeed involved in the creation of every artifact. Even in something as mundane as 
hammering a nail into a wall, there are forces (gravitational, metabolic) which are at 
once presupposed, depended on, not completely known, and necessary.122 This sense 
of “wildness” is also seen as partly composing the artifact, as those processes which 
proceed from it are not strictly captured by the intentions of the designer. Again, we 
could here refer to the example of the mall to illustrate: while certainly it was the 
intention of the owning company to attract customers to the store, the development of 
how shoppers moved throughout the mall, how they conducted themselves within the 
built environment123 is movement, a force, which developed organically from the 
existence of the mall itself. Indeed the artifact, because it really exists in the material 
world, always escapes the strict intention of the designer.124  
It can therefore be observed that the principle behind the wildness of an artifact is 
the autonomy involved. While this may seem like a regression to the first definition of 
nature, it should be noted that this recognition of autonomy is tempered both by the 
emphasis on human practice constituting the world and setting the material processes 
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into motion, as well as the placing of independence within those processes which exist 
beyond the human. That the artifact has received some level of human intervention 
does not infringe upon this wildness, nor does human intention reduce the identity of the 
artifact solely to human intention.125 In this way, it would seem that in the same way we 
can talk of what is good or harmful to said ‘natural’ items, we can likewise talk of what is 
good or harmful for the artifact. That is to say, because an artifact exists as independent 
of human intention, possessing its own autonomy and being wild, its purpose is not 
strictly connected to human intention inasmuch as human intention is not (indeed, it is 
not capable of) always informing it. Purpose(s) may have been involved in its creation, 
yet its status as non-contingent upon human purpose necessitates recognizing the 
artifact’s interests as its own. In the case of the mall, there can be no mistake that the 
purpose of the mall was unique to it and that there were things which were good or bad 
for its existence.126 As Vogel details, the mall grew, responded to changes in the 
environment, underwent transformations, and maintained homeostasis before 
eventually ‘dying’. And indeed, much like any other teleologically oriented structure in 
possession of its own purpose, the mall had interests that were aligned with trying to 
achieve its purpose: the promotion of sales, of new stores and styles arriving, and so 
forth. Similarly, there were things which were contrary to the achievement of its 
purpose, like stores falling into disrepair and new malls being opened across town.  
In turn, this leads to the more important consideration that the recognition of an 
artifact’s autonomy and good necessitates a moral basis for how we should regard 
artifacts. This fact can be better appreciated in light of the erroneous environmentalist 
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prioritization of nature’s independence; Under such a view, Vogel alleges, there is a 
profound sense of inattention paid to artifacts, stating that “We treat them as morally 
insignificant, and...as ontologically insignificant-less important not only than living things 
but also than ‘natural’ abiotic things...”.127 In contrast, Vogel seeks to demonstrate the 
error of not recognizing the moral significance of artifacts. But if it is the case that moral 
significance derives from things possessing an inward purpose which are properly their 
own, then aside from an unfounded preference for biological organisms,128 there should 
be no reason to exclude artifacts from having moral significance; Indeed, insofar as they 
have goods of their own and are autonomous to some respect, artifacts can be said to 
have complexity and teleological ordering, and thereby seemingly have moral worth. 
Indeed, so strong is the need to respect the intrinsic value of artifacts that Vogel goes 
so far as to suggest that the moral respect which is extended to babies should be at 
least analogous to the respect given to artifacts129 as both are fundamentally artifacts 
created by human beings. As such, it can be argued that artifacts should be given 
proper moral consideration, meaning that we must recognize that artifacts are part of 
the constructed environment and that, on account of their complexity and intrinsic 
purpose (and thereby, value) ought to be preserved.130  
The practical consequence of giving moral consideration to artifacts under 
Vogel’s view is the requirement of taking responsibility for our creations, by definition 
including the environment in which we live;131 As Vogel writes “we are responsible for 
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the artifacts that surround us in that we made them...they are part of a world that we 
have worked through our labor to bring into existence132. We have created the world, 
and so must recognize that if the world appears as ugly, unsustainable, or harmful to 
the majority of beings on this planet, then it was through our actions that this came to 
be.133Having understood this, the moral predicament faced within the environmental 
movement is revealed as concerning the premise of creation; while we may find 
ourselves compelled to admit that artifacts may possess intrinsic value due to the 
possibility of such an statement being made in Vogel’s account134 the creation and 
existence of these artifacts poses a moral problem inasmuch as their unintended 
consequences may be environmentally harmful. We therefore cannot take the route 
which attempts to shirk this obligation, or shy away from the necessity of creation 
through inaction. Nor, knowing that artifacts might have intrinsic value, can we suggest 
that there should be some kind of a radical deconstruction of artifacts, or a complete 
abandonment of our current practices.  
Thus the importance of evaluating practices. Taken in conjunction with the 
inability of human transformation of the world to ever achieve the exact intended result, 
this phrase signifies a necessity to carefully evaluate the quality of artifacts and 
practices to the best of our ability. Part of this process is the identification and revision 
of harmful practices, but the more important feature is the creation of practices that are 
actually beneficial for the environment, bearing in mind the gravity of some practices in 
terms of how they constitute the environment. Here Vogel notes how, had people 
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acknowledged their responsibility towards the City Center Mall, then the construction of 
it may have been more ecologically sound.135 That is to say, because the mall was 
constructed in such a way as to see within its existence no intrinsic value,136 or 
understanding that the mall adds to the environment, it was treated as morally 
insignificant to the detriment of said environment. The imperative to consider, 
deliberate, and choose practices in a normatively responsible manner is more pressing 
given what Vogel terms to be the silence of nature, that is, the lack of any clear 
communication from what has traditionally been called nature as to how best to treat 
non-human entities. Though they may possess intrinsic worth, it remains the task of 
humanity to articulate and consider such worth through the dialogical ethics of 
language, which for Vogel can only be accomplished through the process of democratic 
engagement. 
The necessity of the democratic process for proper deliberation and 
argumentation in the process of analyzing and adopting practices has already been 
hinted at from what has been detailed about the nature of practice in general; as the 
environment is produced socially, there can be no debate that everyone should have 
some voice in terms of how it is constructed. Yet as Vogel explains, the necessity for 
democracy in these issues goes even further as democratic engagement is constitutive 
of the very process of moral decision-making in general. This is because of the alluded 
to dialogical process of language. As Vogel explains through the example of two 
pedologists who seek to communicate with each other “They talk. And the way 
language is used between them does, in my view, introduce a new element. They speak 
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with each other, about the sample. Indeed, they argue…”,137 with the act of 
communication involving use of language in discourse and the presence of another so 
as to establish truth. For Vogel, this process of argumentation in the building up of 
knowledge, through advancing claims and establishing truth about the particular subject 
of our study, introduces both normativity and intersubjectivity,138 themselves dependent 
on there being a relationship between the interlocutors;139 In using dialogical language 
to establish truth, a person finds themselves connected with and dependent on the 
person with whom they are engaged. But moreover, this dependency necessitates that 
the dialogical process takes the form of each side trying to justify their particular claim. 
For truth to be reached, it is of course necessary for the scientists to state why they 
propose what they do, in accordance with their experience of the world. What 
fundamentally distinguishes language then is the use of words with another person so 
as to come to a more comprehensive understanding of the world, that is, of what is right 
and wrong. 
 From the attempt to establish the truth of a particular proposition through 
language, it is a very short step to seeing how crucial language is for addressing moral 
claims. But moreover, what is contained within the intersubjectivity of language is 
dialogue, which fundamentally involves reciprocity. As Vogel explains “[Conversation] is 
an ethics of reciprocity, based on the fundamental symmetry of dialogue, as 
interlocutors constantly alternate between... speaker and hearer”.140 This recognition 
that the discussion is between two individuals of equal moral standing who are both 
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seeking to establish the truth of a particular claim, plays into the essentially ethical-
democratic dimension of language in general; If we operate under the recognition that 
the relevant parties are equal participants and change their roles repeatedly in order to 
participate in the discussion, then the process of dialogue contained within language is 
essentially democratic and ethics-regulated inasmuch as dialogue encourages the 
democratic ideals of collaborative deliberation and asserts the equal standing of the 
participants.  
This realization returns us to the relative “silence” of nature; Those things which 
constitute the environment do not engage in dialogue, do not propose the way(s) in 
which they should be treated in our practices.141 This point is obvious, and so is the 
need to reject those ‘ventriloquists’ who claim to speak for ‘nature’ in an authoritative 
capacity. As has been shown, not only is it the case that all people have a ‘connection’ 
to the environment inasmuch as they participate in practices that constitute it, but it is 
also true that the environment cannot speak. As Vogel writes “The silence of nature, 
then, simply means this: that there’s no way to avoid or short-circuit the necessity of 
discourse and the giving of reasons to decide what our ethical duties are, and that the 
apparent inability of nonhuman entities to take part in that discussion entails that our 
duties to such entities...must themselves be a subject matter of that discussion”.142 This 
does not give us license to do whatever we want to the environment, but rather it means 
that because humans can speak and deliberate that we must do so. Indeed, the 
presence of that unique ability to engage in reciprocal dialogue and supply reasons for 
our positions, taken in conjunction with our ability to shape the environment, means that 
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we are solely morally responsible for the environment. Far from allowing us to do 
whatever we want, this recognition of our moral responsibility tied to our speech is in 
fact rather humbling and compels us to act.143  
 Curiously however, this responsibility for constructing a good environment is not 
typically denied; many people profess that it is the duty of humanity to promote those 
practices which help the environment, or at the very least not recklessly engage in 
practices which they consciously acknowledge as harmful.144 Given the best of 
intentions then, it is strange that environmental problems only seem to be getting worse. 
This contradiction is due to a form of alienation. Recalling what has already been said 
about that popular error which treats mankind as distinct from and superior to the world, 
Vogel’s comment that we are alienated from the environment because of our current 
market practices can be more easily appreciated; in much the same way that 
McKibben’s sort of environmentalism stems from the central error of prioritizing Man, 
the current environmental problems can be understood as proceeding from a feeling of 
alienation as a result of the current economic circumstances which force each person to 
act as individuals.145 As previously stated, solving the moral issues associated with the 
environment, like solving any moral issue, is dependent on the process of dialogue. If 
therefore communication is effectively stopped, then the progress made towards a more 
sustainable environment will be infinitesimal, as it would simply be an individual's private 
effort as contrasted against global problems. As Vogel sees the matter, this breakdown 
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of communication is precisely what has happened; Modern capitalism forces each 
person to think in terms of their private ends. But because it encourages this, the 
unification of an individual's productive efforts with another via economic circumstance 
will always appear as originating from, and producing, something unnatural which 
“appears...as something that takes place beyond them (‘naturally’), and therefore as 
something over which they have little control”.146 What this means is that the sort of 
helplessness experienced by the individual in trying to be environmentally conscious is 
very real in that the person's efforts are rendered ineffective by capitalism’s insistence 
that each person think only as an individual who acts solely through the market. Without 
a guarantee that other users of the commons will commit to the same environmentalist 
project, there is no reason to prioritize making a functionally meaningless personal 
sacrifice when personal gain could be achieved instead.147 As it were, each person is 
only acting according to their own rational self-interest. But regardless of whether the 
person chooses what is in their self-interest or not, it remains true that the 
environmentalist “[has] no way to achieve [their goals] through individual action”.148 
Vogel’s counter to such individualism is the establishment of new moral and 
political communities which emphasize “finding a way to restore the discursive 
connection to others”.149 Through a renewed emphasis on the importance of collective 
action. Alone, individuals are powerless to change a practice which has been produced 
socially, let alone one that has escaped our control and so now perpetuates the very 
conditions which sustains it. Yet if moral responsibility is recognized as originating in the 
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collective, then we are better able to describe a path forward.150 For Vogel, the practical 
application of such a recognition means that, in contradistinction to the individualism of 
late-stage capitalism, we must focus on organizing and developing communities which 
mitigate against climate change by “an attempt to promote an effective collective 
agreement that will coordinate reductions in commons use and therefore avert the 
aggregate harms”.151 But as distinct from simply being a collection of individuals who 
have all individually committed themselves to the environmental project, the effective 
agreement necessarily involves the conscious act of self-organization, that is, the social 
structures of that community are arranged via the community itself through a dialogical 
process.152 Here, dialogue is essential, as it not only helps individuals to realize that 
they are part of a social group which determines practices, but it also allows for a 
degree of adaptability; Because the dialogical process is concerned with establishing 
truth while being simultaneously committed to re-evaluation and analysis, it is better 
able to respond to the always contemporaneously generated environment. Moreover, 
the emphasis on dialogue allows for there to be a systematic approach to environmental 
issues; through participating in public discussion and argumentation, the community is 
best able to weigh the importance of artifacts and practices which construct their 
environment, with the strongest argument(s) ideally reigning supreme. Because the 
interactions of the community are mediated by dialogue and depend on the ‘democratic’ 
process of the selection of a method, the central problem of individualism is solved 
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through the introduction of trust and dependence on others as co-moral decision-















































Chapter IV: Some Thoughts on Technology from Vogel 
 
Finally, let us consider what Vogel has to say on technology. When taken in 
conjunction with how practice has been described by Vogel as physical processes 
which create the environment, there is a temptation to equate technology with these 
social-physical practices in general. Yet as early as his initial descriptions of 
construction as a physical process, Vogel states that he wishes to avoid such an 
equivocation, arguing “The first thing to notice is that such processes are much older 
and much broader in scope than the technological ones which have constructed the 
particular modern urbanized environments most people live in today”.153 Later, in 
detailing the problem of relativism, Vogel notes degrees of technologization,154 while 
nevertheless insisting on the social construction of the environment. What therefore can 
be extrapolated from these remarks is the distinction between the process of social 
construction and of technology, the second of which emerges from a particular historical 
circumstance and admits of degrees.  
Turning to Vogel’s most extensive treatment of technology, it would seem that 
the relevant historical condition which so determines the degree of technologization is 
industry, with Vogel explicitly noting that the history of technology is the history of 
industry.155 The development of technology proceeds in accordance with the 
development of industry, a term which Vogel cites Marx as explaining as the actual 
historical relationship of ‘nature’ to Man.156 Yet as this relationship between Man and 
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‘nature’ rests on the latter determining the former through practices, the historical and 
active development of industry is at every moment determined by the same practices. 
Yet as for the character of these industrial practices in comparison with practices in 
general, Vogel’s seems to posit that the world as urbanized through the reach of 
technology is the hallmark of modernity. As such, our world would be constructed by 
technology and is irreversibly technological. Yet this does not solve the problem, as we 
remain with the observation that technology is equal to industry, but no means of 
comparison between technology/industry and social-physical practices in general, aside 
from Vogel’s remark that the two terms are not equivocal, and the possibility that 
technological practices are a subset of social-physical practices.157 Yet insofar as these 
practices seemingly build the world geometrically158 and form the environment by which 
one engages with and knows the world, to speak of ‘technology’ as a historically 
conditioned, equivocal term of industry while remaining distinct from “social practices” in 
general must be to speak of the active developments of this relationship, that is, the 
peculiar innovations of social practices contemporary to a particular age. This reading 
would be in keeping with the criteria set by Vogel as to what delineates technology, as it 
both draws attention to the contemporaneously situated condition of technologies and 
shows how technology is connected to industry, that is, the historical and active relation 
of Man to his environment.   
Marx’s need for an active technology is not a point lost on Vogel. Indeed, Vogel’s 
repeated referral to technologies as a concrete noun, as well as an overall emphasis on 
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the necessarily physical nature of practice, suggests that he wants to focus on the 
physical determinacy of technology, that is, on technology as something produced and 
physically determined. As such, Vogel notes that technologies are often susceptible to 
failure, and the act of their creation must be met with some degree of humility as to what 
tasks can actually be accomplished by our powers of making.159 Similar to what has 
been previously discussed regarding the wildness of social practices and of artifacts, 
the appropriateness of this word in describing technology cannot be overlooked. As 
technology shares in this necessity of resistance as a result of its physicality, it can 
likewise be described as wild.  
This idea of technology as a historically grounded descriptor of the application of 
social practices receives further support in Vogel’s observation that “even those who 
wish to criticize those practices...make the same mistake, too easily believing that some 
practices, technological ones, somehow really do escape...the gap, really do 
domesticate the wild. [But] Fully to pay attention to the nature of artifacts...would lead us 
to rather acknowledge the unavoidable limitations in our abilities, and in our 
technologies…”.160 This passage is rather telling in two ways; First, Vogel’s usage of the 
plural in presentation of his own view seems to suggest the application of this term to 
several things, rather than one particular. Second, for its apparent rejection of 
technology as completely distinct from social practices; here, Vogel is criticizing those 
who think that technological practices somehow escape the gap of wildness between 
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intention and creation; his point is that all practices observe this gap, including those 
producing technologies.161  
In consideration of these points, it would seem that when Vogel speaks of 
technology, he is in fact speaking of those particular artifacts which are contemporary 
manifestations of social practices. As physical practices invariably produce artifacts 
which in turn expand the scope of industry, the equivocation of technology with industry, 
instead of with social practices in general, necessitates a view that emphasizes the 
products of such innovations, as it would only be through measuring these that the 
modern age can be understood as somehow different in the way Vogel seems to desire. 
This also accords with Vogel’s comment on degrees of technologization inasmuch as 
said degrees would pertain to the proliferation of artifacts, certainly increasing in our 
modern age. That is to say, knowing that the distinction between the ideal and practice 
is that the latter generates something real within the world, the only way to 
simultaneously hold fast to the active construction of the world, and belief in technology 
as not equivocal to physical practices, would be to propose that the object of the 
definition of technology is the artifact itself.  
Though this conclusion would seemingly suggest a tension with Vogel’s 
observation that “technological” practices are newer than social practices in general, the 
alternate view wherein technology simply refers to only a specific kind of physical 
practice creates an ontological problem; in insisting on technological practices as 
somehow distinct from social practices in general and only emerged in the relatively 
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recent past, the question would persist as to how they are distinct. Both generate 
artifacts and involve practices that are social-physical. As such, the only possible means 
of distinguishing them would seemingly be to note the relative complexity of modern 
practices and artifacts in technology. But commitment to such a position would be 
demonstrably foolish; for example, there can be no doubt that the production of some 
pieces of ancient architecture admit of a great deal of complexity. Moreover, what 
standard qualifies practices as ‘complex’? This question becomes murkier when it is 
qualified by a demand for the historical age in which ‘technological’ practices emerged. 
Indeed, insofar as Vogel seemingly operates from within Marx’s understanding of 
industry as the historical relation of Man to his environment, which he engages in 
through physical-social practices and is always already in, there would be no room for 
technology to emerge as something ontologically distinct from social-physical practice.  
In turn, this brings us to the more important point that a difference in degree of 
complexity does not distinguish one thing from another ontologically; Indeed, if 
complexity distinguishes technologies from social-physical practice in general, it does 
not follow that there is a real distinction between the two, only growth of the former into 
the latter without a qualitative change in identity. While the terms would not be 
completely synonymous, they also would not be distinguishable enough to warrant 
positing an actually existent ontological difference, as their difference is reducible down 
to being one of quantitative measures of the same process(es). Under this reading, 
there would only be more or less advanced social-physical practices, not a separate 





seemingly be to attribute the term “technology” and “technologies” as relating to artifacts 
produced by social-physical practices, rather than a form of them.  
A Summation  
As Vogel shows, presumptions of a dualism between nature and human practice 
are untenable because they either fail to address that human beings are ever-engaged 
with actively constructing their environment or because they are so broad as to negate 
any distinction as to what is good or bad for the environment. Instead, the environment 
itself is a direct product of physical processes of human artifice that are determined by, 
and invariably bound to, matter. But because we come to know about the world through 
these practices, it is only through them that we understand matter at all. Matter is thus 
always practical, and it is this point, taken in union with the need for practice to be 
based in matter, that shows the interdependence of these two terms; Indeed, as 
physical practice changes the world through a shift in how human beings act, so too 
does what is known and how it is known qualitatively change.  
This joining together of matter and practice contains the additional premise of 
interdependence of matter and the manifestation of that practice, which is the 
technological/artifactual. That is to say, all material things are technological insofar as 
humans have imposed some level of change on them; inversely, all things technological 
are in some sense ‘natural’ because they do not simply aim at mastery on account of 
wildness. The ‘wildness’ of artifacts is demonstrative of this relation, with technologies 
(artifacts) never able to achieve mastery on account of practice’s tendency to break 
down or not accord in the way we desire. The result is a view wherein technology and 





Cognizant of these views, as well as Vogel’s political and ethical solutions, the 
most straightforward path for the person who wishes to support the distinction between 
technology and nature would be to demonstrate that Vogel’s account of technology 
does not accurately capture what is signified by the term. And indeed, Grant’s 
presentation of the historical development of technology reveals it to be more dynamic 
than the picture offered by Vogel inasmuch as the idea of technology is not limited to 
the artifactual and also develops historically. Following from this, Vogel’s account of 
technology appears as relatively static and ultimately unable to appreciate the novelty in 
technological thinking as the co-penetration of the arts and sciences. Thus there is 
sufficient reason to be concerned as to how such technological thinking will develop in 
relation to human dignity, particularly as Grant identifies such modern thinking on 
















Chapter V: The Moral Worries 
Recalling that what lies at the core of technological thinking is the thought that 
one creates themself in their freedom, and that through the exertion of the will, one 
“sees oneself as over against the world, dealing with it...as a series of objects which 
they move around as a means of proving to themselves that they are free,162 it is the 
case that ‘value’ is completely instrumental and wholly tied to the articulation of 
freedom. This desire for freedom, informing the completely demythologized Nietzschean 
paradigm is a calculation made as to whether something or someone supplies a net 
gain to freedom or if they are a detraction. Returning here to the co-penetration of 
technological thinking through our current rational methods, there can be no doubt that 
the proliferation of such methods, aided by an increasingly globalized capitalism, brings 
about an ever-growing homogenized picture of the world. In this way, the proliferation of 
these rational methods affects how people in general regard moral problems and solve 
them via technological means. As Grant observes, the general trend of such 
involvement has been towards extending Nietzschean value statements to the 
aforementioned weak and feeble members of society. In particular, Grant cites 
contemporary language surrounding both abortion and euthanasia; in both cases Grant 
observes the preoccupation of such movements with the appraisal of a particular life as 
worth living or not. In the case of euthanasia, a life is determined as not being worth 
living because of the prolonged difficulties that will be faced, with the exercise of 
appraising whether or not a life has value implying that some people have the right to 
 





judge whether or not someone should exist.163 But by assessing a particular life to not 
have quality, value, or inherent meaning, it cannot be concluded that such a person has 
a right to live. This is even more true if said person is a burden on society and requires 
intensive care; because someone will always need to care for them, they are in effect 
denying their caretaker freedom. Indeed, there is a requirement to kill such individuals, 
as in the interest of preserving dynamic willing, justice would demand an annihilation of 
those who have no value. They are deemed to not be able to have quality of life, so 
there are less moral qualms about killing them. Similarly, in the issue of abortion, Grant 
notes that it receives justification through “the language of the triumph of the will”164 
stressing the moral and significance of fetuses at certain stages of development 
because until a certain predetermined point, the fetus is a secondary concern to the 
freedom of the mother. Indeed, such thinking maps well with the terminology used to 
render the Roe v. Wade decision, wherein it was distinguished that fetuses, though alive 
biologically, were not properly ‘human beings’. The distinction, it appears, is that the 
fetus, up to a certain point, is not capable of being worthy of moral consideration 
because he/she is not potentially alive until the 6th or 7th month165 which can only mean 
that the moral definition of life is to be taken as related to its quality.166  
Grant writes “the creative in their corporations have been told... that justice is 
only a convenience. In carrying out the dynamic convenience of technology, why should 
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they not seek a “justice” which is congruent with those conveniences, and gradually 
sacrifice the principles of liberty and equality when they conflict with the greater 
conveniences?”167 As seen through this example, the formalism of democracy works 
against the human dignity of these feebler people, as the morally unrestrained general 
will of the populace will inevitably lead to greater violations of freedom, as “justified” by 
society through an appeal to “quality of life”.   
Though Grant specifically tackles the issues of abortion and euthanasia, the 
more generalized moral worry should be clear enough: the uncertainty regarding the 
term “quality of life” and the inability of any major social program to articulate a proper 
response to the Nietzschean influenced idea of technology leads to a bleak picture of 
what may become justified within the gradual development of technology in conquering 
chance and necessity for the promotion of individualism. Though it can be retorted that 
certain social institutions exist that advocate for some restrictions to these challenges, 
the problem becomes that there is no universally recognized standard which prevents 
the expansion of this Nietzschean vision of technology; in this sense, both the ‘morally 
conservative’ position of rights and the insistence on the idea of a collectivized ethics is 
doomed to fail as the internal principle of the creative principle plays itself out. As a 
distinct result of the historical development of the idea of technology, we now face a 
moral crisis which attacks any and all versions of human dignity, as value no longer 
refers to some sense of worthiness that transcends the conditions of life, but is now 
solely meant as expression of instrumental worth, of that “summoning forth of reasons” 
for a particular thing’s existence. Again, however, the irony of such a position is that 
 





objective reasons cannot be given, and instead they must always be expressed within 
the language of pursuit of private, creative ends.  
 If then the frontiers of technology are not given within technological thinking, 
they must be supplied from outside it. But while it may be said that the emphasis on 
sociality is somewhat important for determining the direction of technology, the fact that 
technology does exist beyond the artifactual necessitates an even greater moral and 
political response than what Vogel has presented. As Vogel has put the matter, the 
central issue of our inability to respond to environmental problems is the lack of 
communication between said individuals as a result of modern capitalism. Technology 
as such is not the problem, it's the capitalist encouragement of the private use of said 
socially produced technologies; because the community is unable to communicate and 
decide how best to handle environmental issues, everyone simply pursues their private 
ends. Yet as has been shown, the problem of individualism is much more profound and 
historically conditioned than Vogel's assessment would lead one to believe; It is not 
simply the case that economic realities force people into a self-interested individualism, 
but rather, that technology forms an ontology which has people engage in an 
instrumentalized reasoning about the world. Moreover, as history demonstrates, 
technology is not ontologically neutral. As Grant shows, the prioritization of individual 
freedom in order to pursue one's own good is historically born of certain tensions within 
Christian thought. Prior to the Reformation, what is now identified as individualism did 
not have an explicit articulation in politics or morality, and certainly not in ontology. 
Rather, each individual was thought of as participating in a divine order which made a 





the historical cause of individualism, we must look back to Luther and not Smith.168  
 But suppose we modified Vogel's claims and said that modern individualism is 
the result of capitalism? To my mind, Vogel's claim would still be incorrect. Even in its 
modern form, where the accumulation of wealth is increasingly in the hands of only a 
few individuals, the central tenets of capitalist thought have always been that Man must 
involve himself in the market so as to secure those worldly goods which will allow him to 
articulate his idea of freedom, freeing him greatly from the burdens of chance and 
necessity. Moreover, such an ideal of freedom is theoretically open to all. What is 
curious is that, through our actions which “depend on what we consider life to be 
about”,169 there has certainly been a radical break from the pursuit of such an ideal of 
freedom; The emerging disposition that not all necessarily have a right to live shows 
that we have moved past the ideals of freedom and human goodness of capitalism, and 
more towards those conclusions on value, will, and technology detailed by Nietzsche.170 
If therefore we want to include the problems of modern capitalism within an appraisal of 
individualism which is central to environmental issues, capitalism must be regarded as a 
symptom and not the cause.  
This focus on how our actions are informed by myth also brings us to the mistake 
of treating technology as artifactual and as ‘neutral’. Here, Vogel’s suggestion of the 
biological process in fact works against him: in solving environmental issues, Vogel 
argues that we must engage in dialogue with each other, a process that if done correctly 
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will involve the giving of reasons for or against a particular practice and arguing until a 
conclusion is reached. Yet aside from the curious lack of any stipulation as to how large 
such a community should be,171 attention within Vogel's ethical approach is that the 
community is shown as deciding what good they wish to pursue, and then they take the 
appropriate steps to enact it. So considered, it would seem that this is a confirmation of 
Grant’s position that action is prompted by some view of what human life is about, even 
if the moral community is only aligned for the practical purpose of solving environmental 
issues/constructing a good environment. Indeed, Vogel's prescription here seems to 
approach the Marxist vision of overcoming evil (even if in Vogel's view, such an 
overcoming is always active and constantly reassessing and improving practices). 
Having said this, I do not see how it would be possible to avoid the conclusion that the 
construction of artifacts is both historically and contemporaneously conditioned by a 
central myth. More plainly, we should ask: why should this relation between myth and 
artifact construction be posited as something which only occurs in the present, rather 
than be something which occurs historically as well?  
 In this way, artifact production proceeds not just socially and physically, but 
ideologically in relation to Innovations in what is taken to be the purpose of life. The 
particular artifact is not simply an artifact, but rather, it is a product, and suggestive of 
the myth which contextualizes it. The artifact is not ontologically neutral, but rather is 
resultant and prescriptive, encouraging a particular understanding of the world. If such a 
view appears like idealism, it must instantly be stated that it is not; the artifact, though 
the result of and prescriptive of a certain conceptualization of purpose nevertheless 
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does not fully capture what is contained within the myth. As much is evident from 
history, wherein what and how artifacts are produced changes because of tension 
contained within the myth, and so when the myth is overcome through exposing its 
fundamental contradictions, what is produced and how it is produced also changes. 
With artifacts now produced for the sake of quality of life, if it should appear that the 
production of artifacts proceed without a central myth and as simply artifactual, this is 
only because what now stands in the stead of given purpose is the negation of purpose 
and intrinsic meaning as seen most excellently in Nietzsche. As Grant writes “the simple 
characterization of the computer as neutral instrument makes it sound as if instruments 
are now what instruments have always been, and so hides from us what is completely 
novel about modern instrumentality”.172 As it were, Vogel has history backwards: myth 
does not flow from practice, but practice from myth. Thus, Vogel’s commitment to such 
a view is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores the development of technology as distinct 
from technique and anachronistically disperses its version of technology across history. 
 As a result of these misconceptions, Vogel is unable to appreciate the novelty of 
what is truly meant by the term.  In such a view, the value of anything is calculated in 
relation to dynamic willing, and conceals an ontology which shapes what people are 
encouraged to know and do,173 that is, how to be in the world. And such an account has 
been detailed: it is expressed in the thought of Nietzsche, with the accompanying moral 
concerns that follow. Here, we can see how this misconception about technology 
reveals two problems with Vogel's moral and political conclusions. The first is that the 
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failure to appreciate technology as an ontology leads Vogel to underestimate how 
profound the problem of individualism is. Indeed, he attributed it to capitalism, and says 
that the emergence of a moral community resolves this individualism. This itself fails in 
two ways. The first is that, even if the community could be formed, the evaluation and 
implementation of new practices would continue to reinscribe the individualistic account 
that informs them. This is because the problem is not the material practice per se, but 
the myth that informs it. The correction of practice, in order to truly challenge the 
individualistic account must correct said account’s fundamental ontological 
presumptions. As such, secondly, the insistence on a dialogical approach will almost 
certainly not work because of the difficulties in establishing a new myth which can 
prompt human action and approach a level of moral commitment that is non-transient. 
Vogel's emphasis on dialogue is well-intended, but the manner in which such 
communication is framed in Vogel's view, as simply coming to a conclusion through 
dialogue and argumentation, does not address the need for a new myth, that is, it does 
not sufficiently challenge the Nietzschean paradigm. Nor could it. This is because the 
entirety of Vogel’s program is too ideologically close to Marx; though Vogel does not 
commit to the total Revolution which was charged in orthodox Marxism as leading 
towards a Utopia, he does seemingly believe in the “myth of progress” inasmuch as he 
states we must constantly be striving for the improvement of the environment and 
reevaluation of practices. Indeed, this is seemingly presented as a goal which society 
must realize and progress towards. However, as Nietzsche has demonstrated, we have 
moved beyond the idea of progress, or at least we should have if we are truly committed 





previously dismissed myth of progress, we need to similarly deny Vogel's view should 
Nietzsche be correct. And again, given the current state of the technological society, it 
would seem he is.  
 The second way that Vogel’s misconceptions about technology reveal his 
political and moral conclusions as inadequate is through the interjection of value into the 
world. More plainly, that value given through democratic dialogue does not provide 
society adequate reason to act on such value. To further elucidate, it is worth 
mentioning that on Vogel's account, artifacts seemingly have some intrinsic worth; they 
have “goods of their own'' and are in some sense autonomous. However, Vogel notes 
that the process of democratic dialogue will necessarily involve choosing those artifacts 
and practices which are worth preserving and those that are not, with the intrinsic worth 
of artifacts ideally prompting us to more carefully consider what we make. In fact, so 
great is the need to respect the intrinsic worth of artifacts that Vogel charges they 
should be treated almost in the same manner as how one would treat a baby.174 
Nevertheless, what is curious to note is that there does not seem to be much room in 
Vogel's account to say that children are indeed morally superior to other kinds of 
artifacts. The consequences of these considerations mean two things with respect to 
values. First that it would be permissible to morally prioritize one type of artifact (say, a 
fridge) over another (such as a child), provided that such a choice is made through the 
process of argumentative dialogue. Second, that what is valuable is ever at the mercy of 
democratic engagement. While artifacts and practices may have intrinsic good, their 
relative value is still to be analyzed and judged by the moral community and is thereby 
 





subject to this dialogue based process. Given then the Nietzschean appraisal of things 
as existing meaninglessly, it is unclear how dialogue subverts the problem of 
individualism. Certainly some people in Nietzsche’s account may be ‘good’ insofar as 
they dynamically will, but Nietzsche's challenge to religion includes a critique of the idea 
of inherent value, that is, that aside from the strong men, it is not good per se that a 
particular thing or person exists. Therefore, shifting the focus from the individual proper 
to a collection of individuals called “a community” without also correcting the problems 
inherent to the Nietzschean rejection of myth or the development of technology simply 
strengthens Nietzsche’s argument: through the democratic process, value is still being 
determined according to instrumental usefulness. Indeed, the lack of a true centralized 
myth means that we cannot say that anything has a good which demands respect. We 
may dignify it with such because such an object is instrumentally useful for our dynamic 
willing, but without a proper critique of the Nietzschean program, we cannot say such 
things are inherently valuable, nor by extension can we say that any instrumental value 
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